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ABSTRACT—By many accounts, the financial technology, or FinTech, 
sector appears to have developed an innovative solution to assist low-income 
workers with income shortfalls between standard paydays by displacing 
fringe financial service providers, namely payday lenders. Earned wage 
access programs facilitate early transfers of earned-but-unpaid wages to low-
income workers through mobile platforms, algorithmic technology, and GPS 
tracking. To many, earned wage access programs represent a win-win for 
employees and employers. These programs are believed to be cheaper and 
safer alternatives to payday loans. Preliminary research also suggests these 
programs improve labor-retention rates for employers and help reduce 
financial distress for low-income employees. Consequently, a growing 
number of employers, including Walmart Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., have 
partnered with earned wage access providers to offer these programs as an 
employee benefit. Employees may also use third-party providers that bypass 
employers to offer these programs directly through mobile-app stores. In less 
than a decade, this nascent market has impressively achieved national scale, 
hundreds of thousands of employer partnerships, millions of users, and 
billions of dollars in transactions. 
Yet, notwithstanding and perhaps because of these early successes, 
these programs also have downsides that have been much less emphasized. 
In particular, although the gatekeeping role that employers may play when 
partnering with earned wage access programs has the potential to facilitate 
improved pricing and service terms in the fringe financial market, such a role 
also masks significant costs that are not fully disclosed to employees. 
Additionally, the earned wage access market creates detrimental regulatory 
blind spots and enables regulatory arbitrage by blurring the lines between 
once-distinct financial services: money-transmission services and loan 
services. Earned wage access programs have largely operated with minimal 
legal constraints because they have generally been characterized as money-
transmission services, rather than loan services like payday loans. Building 
on the FinTech literature, by analogy, this Article argues that this blanket 
characterization of earned wage access programs is a mistake. Earned wage 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1506 
access programs have varying effects. In the absence of regulatory 
guardrails, some programs can perpetuate, and in some instances exacerbate, 
the very risks providers claim to eliminate when displacing short-term 
creditors like payday lenders.  
This Article proposes a federal-level regulatory framework based on 
lending laws that addresses some of these unmitigated risks through the 
imposition of consumer-protection requirements such as uniform price 
disclosure, ability-to-repay rules, optional amortization mechanics, 
mandatory credit reporting, and a right-to-rescind assignment. In doing so, 
this Article aims to facilitate growth of the earned wage access market’s 
functional improvements and prevent a mere shift to fringe FinTech, or 
“FringeTech,” services. 
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“The ingenuity of man has not devised a contrivance by which usury can be 
legalized . . . . [F]or the name by which the transaction is denominated is 
altogether immaterial, if it appears that a loan of money was the foundation 
and basis of the agreement which is under consideration.” 
           —Bank of Lumpkin v. Farmers’ State Bank† 
INTRODUCTION 
Earned wage access programs, or “earned wage programs,”1 are 
internet- and mobile-based platforms that have emerged in recent years to 
serve as safer alternatives to much-maligned payday loans. Payday loans are 
part of a nearly $80 billion credit market that has long served the small-sum 
 
 †  132 S.E. 221, 221 (Ga. 1926) (syllabus by the court).  
 1 These services are sometimes called “early wage access,” “on-demand pay,” “instant pay,” “daily 
pay benefit,” or “earned income access.” 
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credit needs of millions of primarily low- and moderate-income Americans,2 
much to the dismay of many scholars, lawmakers, and consumer advocates. 
These loans cost borrowers an average annual percentage rate (APR) of 
nearly 400%.3 They also have well-documented detrimental effects on 
borrowers’ financial health.4 Earned-wage programs promise to reduce 
demand for payday loans by facilitating transfers of earned-but-unpaid 
wages to workers in advance of their standard periodic paydays. It is 
questionable, however, whether earned-wage programs offer consumers a 
meaningful reprieve from payday loans. 
Consider two fictional employees that we will call Jack and Jill for 
illustrative purposes. Jack, the average Walmart employee, enjoys an 
employee benefit that allows him to transfer a portion of his earned-but-
unpaid wages prior to his scheduled payday for a monthly subscription fee 
of $6 that is subsidized by Walmart.5 And Jill, the average movie-theater 
employee, uses a similar program downloaded from her mobile-application 
store that does not charge her a fee at all but encourages her to tip for each 
transfer. These earned-wage programs promise to create “a more equitable 
financial system for the millions of people on the lowest rungs of the 
economic ladder.”6 Many providers claim to give employees greater 
autonomy in the timing of their pay without the need for expensive credit 
products.7 In other words, earned-wage programs are said to make earned 
 
 2 See KAREN GRAHAM & ELAINE GOLDEN, 2019 FINANCIALLY UNDERSERVED MARKET SIZE 
STUDY 3, app. at 12 (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files-2018/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/31170215/2019-Market-Size-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P7L-B5EE] 
(estimating annual loan volumes for credit products that are designed to be reimbursed in a one-time 
payment, including overdraft protection, pawn services, online and storefront payday loans, and refund-
anticipation checks); see also Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (discussing the origins of payday loans in check-cashing locations in the 
early 1990s). 
 3 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE DEBT TRAP OF TRIPLE-DIGIT INTEREST RATE LOANS: 
PAYDAY, CAR-TITLE, AND HIGH-COST INSTALLMENT LOANS (2019), https://www.responsible 
lending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-finfairness-payday-mar2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BE8B-AR57] (noting that payday loans carry average APRs of 391%).  
 4 See infra notes 277–282 and accompanying text.  
 5 See Anne Tergesen, Some Companies Offer a New Benefit: Payroll Advances and Loans, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-companies-offer-a-new-benefit-
payroll-advances-and-loans-11567416601 [https://perma.cc/ZW8T-BXBP] (“Employees pay $6 a month 
to use PayActiv . . . . [and] Walmart covers the cost for one month per quarter . . . .”). 
 6 Gaby Del Valle, How a Silicon Valley Startup Is Trying to Rebrand Payday Loans, VOX (May 22, 
2019, 4:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/5/22/18636049/earnin-app-startup-payday-loans-
fintech [https://perma.cc/X36L-PCMQ] (paraphrasing Earnin founder Ram Palaniappan).  
 7 See, e.g., Donna Fuscaldo, Demand for Earned Wages Services Surging amid COVID-19, FORBES 
(May 19, 2020, 3:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/donnafuscaldo/2020/05/19/demand-for-earned-
wages-services-surging-amid-covid-19/?sh=106305a34b71 [https://perma.cc/STQ2-C324] (quoting an 
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wages available on demand, like an ATM for your paycheck,8 rather than 
offer a costly cash advance to be repaid at a later time, as in the payday-loan 
context. However, a fundamental yet less explored question is whether Jack 
and Jill are better off with earned-wage programs as compared to payday 
loans. 
Proponents of earned-wage programs assert that these programs 
represent a significant improvement over payday loans and are long-overdue 
innovations to a high-cost market that currently serves the small-sum 
liquidity demands of many American workers.9 Between 50% to 78% of 
Americans live paycheck to paycheck,10 and 40% cannot cover a $400 
emergency expense.11 Add on the rising number of “gig economy” and 
freelance workers with volatile incomes,12 and the fragility of U.S. household 
 
industry executive, who said that “[i]f they get more access to their money[,] they don’t have to rely on 
short term financing”). 
 8 See, e.g., Jeff Kauflin, VCs Bet $40 Million on Money App for Those Living Paycheck to Paycheck, 
FORBES (July 19, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2018/07/19/payday-loans-
be-gone-a-growing-set-of-startups-are-gunning-to-unseat-them/#18f219446850 [https://perma.cc/ 
XRX3-ZKJ8] (quoting DailyPay CEO, who stated that “DailyPay is an ATM for earned or unpaid 
wages[;] . . . . [j]ust like an ATM, a user accesses her money and pays a transaction fee”). 
 9 See, e.g., Dan Quan, Don’t Sideline Earned Income Access, AM. BANKER (June 3, 2019, 10:00 
AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dont-sideline-earned-income-access [https://perma.cc/ 
9U5L-2TZE] (“For the first time, there is a viable market solution that has the promise of significantly 
lowering the cost of helping consumers manage short term cash flow needs and improving their financial 
lives.”). 
 10 The reported percentage of Americans living paycheck to paycheck varies—it is often between 
50% and 78%, depending on the consumer survey. Ilyce Glink & Samuel J. Tamkin, A Breakdown of 
What Living Paycheck to Paycheck Looks Like, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
2020/08/17/breakdown-what-living-paycheck-to-paycheck-looks-like/ [https://perma.cc/3YGY-6SH3]; 
see also, e.g., NEW DATA: 60 Percent of US Consumers Now Live Paycheck-to-Paycheck, PYMNTS 
(Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/coronavirus/2020/navigating-pandemic-consumers-paycheck-
to-paycheck/ [https://perma.cc/M9YK-J5F7] (“[A]bout six out of 10 U.S. consumers now report living 
paycheck-to-paycheck . . . .”); Megan Leonhardt, 63% of Americans Have Been Living Paycheck to 
Paycheck Since Covid Hit, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/ 
12/11/majority-of-americans-are-living-paycheck-to-paycheck-since-covid-hit.html [https://perma.cc/ 
3EZM-P8A2] (reporting 63%); Zack Friedman, 78% of Workers Live Paycheck to Paycheck, FORBES 
(Jan. 11, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/11/live-paycheck-to-
paycheck-government-shutdown/?sh=3295da0c4f10 [https://perma.cc/V4C3-2VV5] (reporting 78%).  
 11 Amelia Barwise & Mark Liebow, When Generosity Harms Health Care and Public Health, 
109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 997, 997 (2019). 
 12 See, e.g., Penny Crosman, The Challenger Banks Catering to Gig-Economy Workers, AM. 
BANKER (Feb. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/the-challenger-banks-
catering-to-gig-economy-workers [https://perma.cc/K953-GPYT] (discussing high-earning self-
employed workers, including attorneys and consultants, whose unpredictable earnings and cashflow 
shortfalls made them prime payday-loan candidates). 
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income simply cannot be overstated.13 The coronavirus pandemic has 
underscored the precarity of American household finances14 and amplified 
the already-high demand for immediate access to income.15 Yet, the dearth 
of low-cost, income-smoothing solutions available to low-income 
consumers makes the financial vulnerability of this consumer class more 
acute. Notwithstanding the risks of payday loans, which include heightened 
financial distress and insolvency,16 over 12 million17 primarily low-income 
individuals spend an estimated $4.6 billion in fees on payday loans 
annually.18 The prevalence of payday loans, despite their negative attributes, 
suggests there are significant market and policy failures at play,19 which 
make the payday-loan market ripe for innovative, new entrants like earned-
wage programs. 
Earned-wage programs facilitate wage transfers not only through novel 
platforms but also through innovative business models and fee structures. 
Specifically, earned-wage providers utilize two broad business models: the 
employer-sponsored model and the third-party model. Employer-sponsored 
 
 13 See THEA GARON, ANDREW DUNN, KATY GOLVALA & ERIC WILSON, U.S. FINANCIAL HEALTH 
PULSE: 2018 BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS 3 (2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files-
2018/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/07151007/FHN-Pulse_Baseline_SurveyResults-web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L7VZ-2CSP ] (finding that only 28% of Americans are “financially healthy”). 
 14 See David Harrison, Lack of Savings Worsens the Pain of Coronavirus Downturn, WALL ST. J., 
(Apr. 15, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lack-ofsavingsworsens-the-pain-of-
coronavirus-downturn-11586943001 [https://perma.cc/4HDT-YRZ2]. 
 15 See Kate Fitzgerald, Earned Wage Access: A Coronavirus Fad or a Turning Point for Payroll?, 
PAYMENTSSOURCE (June 10, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.paymentssource.com/news/earned-wage-
access-a-coronavirus-fad-or-a-turning-point-for-payroll [https://perma.cc/YT3G-4NQC] (“Fintech firms 
specializing in employer-sponsored EWA services have seen exponential user growth during the 
pandemic, with the rising numbers of gig workers hired in health care, fast food and grocery sectors, and 
new EWA providers continuing to join the fray.”). 
 16 See infra notes 277–282. 
 17 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY 
BORROW, AND WHY 4 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/ 
2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJQ3-7KUH]. 
 18 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau expressed this concern when announcing an 
amendment to 12 C.F.R. § 1041, known as the “Payday Rule.” See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain 
High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,384 (July 22, 2020); CFPB Statement on Payday 
Rule, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/ [https://perma.cc/V7PJ-HQ6Z]. 
 19 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 100 
(2008) (finding that minimum product safety standards are noticeably absent in the regulations of payday 
loans, that payday loans are designed to obscure their risks and to exploit consumer misunderstanding, 
and that ordinary market mechanisms, such as competition and expert advisors, cannot fully correct these 
deficiencies); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQUALITY 135, 159 (finding that 
“[p]ayday loans . . . exploit[] the consumer’s optimism bias that predicts an ability to pay the loan in full 
at the next payday, and discounts the inevitable recurrence of the cash shortage that prompted the loan”). 
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providers partner with employers and human-resource firms to offer earned-
wage programs as an employee benefit,20 while third-party providers bypass 
employers to offer services directly to employees through the internet or 
mobile applications.21 Under each model, earned-wage programs collect 
payroll and timesheet data to estimate accrued net wages and make all or a 
portion of such wages available for a fee. Earned wage program fees are 
reflected as flat fees and their structures vary greatly.22 There are periodic fee 
structures, such as subscription and per-period fees, that allow for multiple 
transfers under a single fee ranging from $5 to $8.23 There are per-transaction 
fee structures that charge a fee of $2 to $5 for each transfer.24 There are also 
free models that do not charge a fee at all but instead encourage employees 
to pay tips as high as $14 for each transfer.25 Occasionally, employer partners 
subsidize the fees in part or in full. Consequently, the fees for any given 
transaction can amount to an APR in the wide range of 70% to 470%, 
depending on the program used and the timing of the transfer.26 Earned-wage 
providers are typically reimbursed on the employee’s next payday through a 
preauthorized electronic funds transfer (EFT) from their personal bank 
account or, for some employer-sponsored providers, a payroll deduction.27 
The timing and design of earned-wage programs have facilitated the 
sector’s exponential growth. Marketed as the antithesis of the now-notorious 
payday loan,28 earned-wage programs were a welcomed innovation in the 
 
 20 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/faq/ 
[https://perma.cc/9YHS-P2L9] (“PayActiv partners with employers to deliver financial wellness services 
to employees. Employer agrees to offer PayActiv as an employee benefit. No integration is needed, as 
the existing payroll and time and attendance system is leveraged.”). 
 21 See, e.g., How Do I Create an Account and How Long Does It Take to Get Started?, EARNIN 
(2020), https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-us/articles/213412127-How-do-I-create-an-account-and-how-
long-does-it-take-to-get-started- [https://perma.cc/7BGJ-3ZVV] (explaining how this third-party 
provider offers services directly to employees through the internet); see also Samara Lynn, Cash Advance 
Apps Like Dave, Earnin See Use Surge amid COVID-19, ABC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:05 AM) 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/turn-payday-advance-apps-coronavirus-batters-economy/story?id=7011850 
8 [https://perma.cc/N7QQ-KU69] (discussing Earnin and another third-party provider, Dave). 
 22 See infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 28 Payday loans are rapidly declining in popularity due, in part, to increased regulation, public 
scrutiny, and shifts in consumer demand. See, e.g., Lisa Rowan, Nebraska Becomes Latest State to Cap 
Payday Loan Fees, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2020, 10:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2020/ 
11/04/nebraska-becomes-latest-state-to-cap-payday-loan-fees/?sh=6fa1abb61150 [https://perma.cc/ 
KZU6-BRGV] (reporting that over 80% of Nebraska voters approved a measure to cap short-term loan 
fees at 36%, joining a slowly growing list of states that effectively ban payday loans); PEW CHARITABLE 
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oft-overlooked fringe financial marketplace.29 From an employee 
perspective, these programs appear safer than traditional alternatives like 
payday loans since they are marketed as inexpensive noncredit services. 
From an employer perspective, these programs seemingly help reduce labor 
costs associated with high turnover and low productivity amongst employees 
who may be financially distressed, without a need to increase wages.30 And 
from a regulatory perspective, earned-wage programs are still novel enough 
in form that they have yet to be legally defined, creating low regulatory 
barriers to entry that are uncommon compared to competing services.31  
Unsurprisingly, the market for earned-wage programs has grown 
rapidly over the last several years.32 While the precise size of the market 
 
TRS., AMERICANS WANT PAYDAY LOAN REFORM, SUPPORT LOWER-COST BANK LOANS: RESULTS OF A 
NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY OF U.S. ADULTS 2 (2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2017/04/americans-want-payday-loan-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LVU-5KJC] (finding 
“7 in 10 Americans, Borrowers Want Payday Loans to Be More Regulated”); Payday, Vehicle Title, and 
Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,384 (July 22, 2020) (“Reports from several 
States and publicly traded companies offering payday loans show a shift from payday loans to small-
dollar installment loans and other credit products.”).   
 29 See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Walmart and Others Offer Workers Payday Loan Alternative, NPR (Aug. 
16, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/639236531/walmart-and-others-offer-workers-
payday-loan-alternative [https://perma.cc/CNE3-SSSB] (quoting proponents, including a small-business 
owner and a director at the United Way, referring to earned-wage programs as “a good idea,” “game-
changing,” and “really exciting”).  
 30 See, e.g., Todd H. Baker, FinTech Alternatives to Short-Term Small-Dollar Credit: Helping Low-
Income Working Families Escape the High-Cost Lending Trap 56–57 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. M-RCBG 
Assoc. Working Paper Series, No. 75, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/ 
mrcbg/files/75_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARZ4-H9CH] (finding that surveyed firms provided low-cost 
income smoothing without significant credit risk to the FinTech firm or employer); Todd Baker & 
Snigdha Kumar, The Power of the Salary Link: Assessing the Benefits of Employer-Sponsored FinTech 
Liquidity and Credit Solutions for Low-Wage Working Americans and Their Employers (Harvard 
Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG Assoc. Working Paper No. 88, 2018) [hereinafter HKS 2018 Study], 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/working.papers/88_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UJC5-55G8] (associating active use of earned-wage program with a 19% reduction in 
employee turnover and an anticipated $110 million annual savings for employers).  
 31 For example, some earned-wage providers operate in states that prohibit substitutes like payday 
loans. See Penny Crosman, A Payday Lender in Disguise? New York Investigates, AM. BANKER (Apr. 3, 
2019, 9:03 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-payday-lender-in-disguise-new-york-
investigates-the-earnin-app [https://perma.cc/WL8F-FAHE] (discussing Earnin’s operations in New 
York, a state that limits annual percentage yield rates to 25%, and describing how Earnin behaves as a 
payday lender). 
 32 See, e.g., PayActiv Crosses $1 Billion in Processed Funds for Timely Earned Wage Access to the 
Underserved and Underbanked Workforce, PAYACTIV (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.payactiv.com/ 
press/payactiv-crosses-1-billion-in-processed-funds-for-timely-earned-wage-access-to-the-underserved-
and-underbanked-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/47KG-NJ23] (noting that PayActiv has advanced over $1 
billion to over 650,000 individuals); Cyrus Farivar, Millions Use Earnin to Get Cash Before Payday. 
Critics Say the App Is Taking Advantage of Them., NBC NEWS (July 26, 2019, 3:41 AM), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/millions-use-earnin-get-cash-payday-critics-say-app-taking-n1034071 
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remains unknown, research suggests this is an impressive multibillion-dollar 
industry serving millions of customers. The largest third-party provider 
alone facilitates an estimated $2.5 billion in earned-wage transfers 
annually.33 A handful of employer-sponsored programs facilitated more than 
$9.5 billion in 2020, which was approximately a 50% increase from 2019 
and 200% increase from 2018.34 These programs also boast partnerships with 
thousands of firms, including large employers and human-resource 
companies like Walmart Inc., ADP Marketplace,35 and, most recently, 
Amazon.com, Inc.36 And the market’s growth has not cratered in the midst 
of the coronavirus pandemic. To the contrary, one earned-wage provider 
more than doubled its employer partnerships during the five months of 
March to August in 2020, as compared to the entire year of 2019.37 Another 
provider reported a 400% increase in users in the early months of the 
pandemic.38 Earned-wage providers are also seeking to expand beyond 
predominately low-income employees to white-collar employees.39 
 
[https://perma.cc/2NTV-KGLX] (“Since 2015, the analysis firm Apptopia estimates that [Earnin] has 
been downloaded more than 12 million times. More than half of those downloads came within the last 
year.”).  
 33 See Farivar, supra note 32 (“Earnin does not publicly disclose how much money it processes, but 
screenshots of an internal analytics website shared with NBC News by a current employee earlier this 
month show that the company moves an average of over $212 million a month.”). 
 34  LESLIE PARRISH, AITE GRP., MAKING ENDS MEET: ON-DEMAND PAY AND EMPLOYER-BASED 
LOANS 3, 17 (2021), https://aitegroup.com/report/making-ends-meet-demand-pay-and-employer-based-
loans [https://perma.cc/7T2J-SX56]. 
 35 ADP Marketplace offers human-capital-management solutions to over 860,000 employers 
representing approximately 37 million employees. Corporate Overview, ADP (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.adp.com/~/media/Corporate%20Overview/ADP-Corporate-Overview.ashx [https://perma. 
cc/5Q73-L5XQ].   
 36 Lauren Kaori Gurley, Amazon Launches Payday Advances for Its Most Precarious Warehouse 
Workers, VICE (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:42 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/93w95d/amazon-launches-
payday-advances-for-its-most-precarious-warehouse-workers [https://perma.cc/FQ9T-C7XY] (reporting 
that Amazon is now offering an earned-wage program called Anytime Pay to low-wage warehouse 
workers).   
 37 Tara Siegel Bernard, Apps Will Get You Paid Early, for a Price, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/your-money/cash-advance-apps-paychecks.html 
[https://perma.cc/VX2U-KL64] (“In recent months, hundreds of companies—including Kroger, Wayfair, 
Dollar Tree, Staffmark, HCA Healthcare and Mercy Hospitals—have begun offering the apps to 
employees.”). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Chris Opfer, ‘Early Wage’ Apps Aim to Disrupt Payday Loans, Two-Week Cycle, BLOOMBERG L. 
(Aug. 1, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/early-wage-apps-aim-to-
disrupt-payday-loans-two-week-cycle [https://perma.cc/6YSL-M4T3] (“DailyPay’s [Jason] Lee and Jon 
Schlossberg, the CEO of Even, say they see the market also moving into the white-collar workforce.”); 
see also Michelle Rafter, Increase Employee Job Satisfaction with Early-Pay Apps, PCMAG (Oct. 4, 
2019), https://www.pcmag.com/article/371114/increase-employee-job-satisfaction-with-early-pay-apps 
[https://perma.cc/R5RD-EQDN] (“At companies that give employees early access to their paychecks 
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Yet, as the earned-wage market continues to pick up steam, it has 
garnered critical attention from state regulators,40 policymakers,41 and 
consumer-advocacy groups.42 Observers are increasingly suspicious of the 
earned-wage market’s effect on employees like Jack and Jill. The primary 
question raised is often a legal one: whether earned-wage programs ought to 
be characterized as money-transmission services or loan services. If the 
former, these programs align payroll processes with the ever-increasing 
consumer demand for real-time transactions, albeit at costs borne by 
employees that possibly reduce real wages. If the latter, however, earned-
wage programs violate a host of state and federal consumer-protection laws, 
including usury limits and uniform disclosure requirements. A federal class 
action sought to answer this question,43 but a recent settlement likely will 
delay any definitive conclusion about the applicable legal framework for 
earned-wage programs.44 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) also recently weighed in with narrow responses. It issued an 
advisory opinion that certain no-fee employer-sponsored programs did not 
constitute loan services45 and granted access to the CFPB’s regulatory 
 
through an app from startup DailyPay, 12 percent of those workers earn more than $100,000 per 
year . . . .”).  
 40 See, e.g., Dean Seal, NY Leads Multistate Investigation of Payroll Advance Industry, LAW360 
(Aug. 6, 2019, 8:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1185645/ny-leads-multistate-investigation-
of-payroll-advance-industry [https://perma.cc/5R6Y-KX4D] (announcing that New York regulators were 
joined by nine states and Puerto Rico in investigating possible state lending-law violations by certain 
earned-wage programs, including Earnin). 
 41 Yuka Hayashi, Pay-Access Apps Face Regulatory Test, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pay-access-apps-face-regulatory-test-11567416602 [https://perma.cc/ 
QL7X-8JYP] (discussing California’s efforts to enact unprecedented earned-wage legislation). 
 42 The author participated on a panel discussion titled “Early Wage Access: Costs, Benefits, and 
Risks for Consumers” during the Consumer Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference 
2019. See id. (reporting concerns from the National Consumer Law Center that the market may 
“authorize[] a new category of payday loans that don’t have to comply with interest-rate limits”).  
 43 Complaint at 26–30, Stark v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-7553 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019) 
(claiming Earnin violated California’s Unfair Competition Law and Deferred Deposit Transaction Law, 
among other state laws, and the Truth in Lending Act). 
 44 In July 2020, the lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed in connection with a settlement in a separate 
lawsuit to which the plaintiff was an interested party. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion 
for Final Approval of Class Settlement & for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, & Service Awards, 
Perks v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-05543-BLF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021).  
 45 Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Earned Wage Access Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,404 (Nov. 30, 
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_adviso
ry-opinion_earned-wage-access_2020-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B9P-LXWN]. 
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sandbox to one provider.46 But these actions left the question unresolved with 
respect to the vast majority of the earned-wage market. 
This Article, however, suggests that the current focus on whether 
earned-wage programs are money-transmission or loan services, or 
something entirely distinct,47 misses an even more fundamental inquiry: 
whether and to what extent do earned-wage programs mitigate or exacerbate 
consumer risks that have long plagued the payday-loan market. Consumers 
who use payday loans have heightened risks of financial distress and 
insolvency as compared to similarly situated nonpayday borrowers.48 
Scholars often claim these risks arise from information asymmetries, 
inadequate bargaining power, and cognitive limitations that are exploited by 
payday lenders.49 In response to these risks, the literature regularly considers 
solutions like disclosure rules and state-level consumer protections, which 
have mixed results,50 and federal-level consumer protections, which have 
been scant.51 In responding to this fundamental inquiry, this Article examines 
the market not from the perspective of the supply side but that of the demand 
 
 46 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., APPROVAL ORDER 1 (Dec. 30, 2020), https://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_payactiv_approval-order_2020-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL9U-
BGJ4] (approving Payactiv, Inc.’s application for access to the CFPB’s Compliance Assistance Sandbox). 
 47 Notably, several state legislatures have considered industry-backed measures to carve out distinct 
licensing frameworks for earned-wage programs. See, e.g., Stephen T. Middlebrook, Earned Wage 




Y7VW] (discussing recently proposed South Carolina bill); Stephen T. Middlebrook, It’s a Jersey Thing: 
Earned Wage Access Bill Gets Amended, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 27, 2020),  https://www.natlawreview 
.com/article/it-s-jersey-thing-earned-wage-access-bill-gets-amended [https://perma.cc/VNM6-HBPS] 
(discussing legislative proposals in California, New York, and New Jersey); Kevin Wack, The Derailment 
of California’s Payroll Advance Law, AM. BANKER (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.americanbanker 
.com/news/the-derailment-of-californias-payroll-advance-law [https://perma.cc/3WKP-56CD] 
(discussing ongoing legislative battles about regulating earned-wage programs in California). 
 48 See infra Section III.B.2. 
 49 See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19 (arguing that consumer-credit markets, including 
the payday-loan market, require enhanced regulatory safeguards because of imperfect information 
sharing, imperfectly rational consumers, and the reality that the “informed minority” of consumers cannot 
alone drive the market). 
 50 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 665–79 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of mandated disclosure rules despite their 
shortcomings, which include consumer misunderstanding and information overload); Heather L. 
Petrovich, Circumventing State Consumer Protection Laws: Tribal Immunity and Internet Payday 
Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326, 341–46 (2012) (discussing the reasons state law is inadequate in 
protecting consumers from predatory payday-loan practices).  
 51 See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians 
from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 680–83 (2012) (discussing the failures of the 
federal government to enact protections for consumers despite how necessary they are).  
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side, disregarding the earned-wage program’s novel form and focusing on its 
function to better understand and respond to its market effects. 
In analyzing various earned-wage programs, this Article finds promise 
and peril in this nascent and lightly regulated market. Although employers 
may serve as promising gatekeepers to protect employees more effectively 
from the market failures present in the payday-loan context, their 
gatekeeping role may also impose material costs on consumers.52 
Additionally, many earned-wage programs have features—such as relatively 
high costs, limited underwriting, and credit invisibility—that are associated 
with significant consumer risks in the payday-loan context.53 Yet, the 
regulatory ambiguity of the earned-wage market means that employees are 
left increasingly vulnerable to these costs and risks, but they are unable to 
fully appreciate them. Such costs and risks are uncommon in traditional 
money-transmission transactions, and, therefore, the legal framework for 
money-transmission services neither contemplates nor mitigates them. 
Accordingly, this Article argues that earned wage access programs have 
varying effects, and in the absence of regulatory guardrails, some programs 
can perpetuate, and sometimes exacerbate, the very risks providers claim to 
eliminate when displacing short-term creditors like payday lenders. It calls 
for a long-overdue federal framework for small-sum liquidity solutions that 
contemplates the risky innovations of earned-wage programs but 
accommodates a dynamic, national marketplace. 
In doing so, this Article contributes to a nascent literature on earned-
wage programs with an arguably more critical view of the market. 
Contemporaneous scholarship by Professor Jim Hawkins has focused on 
how the data-collection methods and novel features of earned-wage 
programs allow providers to offer services that are superior to payday loans 
primarily by eliminating the risk of high fees.54 However, by focusing on the 
consumer effects and regulatory gaps associated with earned-wage 
programs, this Article contends that these programs perpetuate not only the 
risk of high fees but also the related risks associated with deferred 
repayment, limited underwriting, and credit invisibility, which can lead to 
financially deleterious debt cycles. It expands on Professor Hawkins’s 
 
 52 See infra Section III.C.2. 
 53 See infra Section III.B.2. 
 54 See generally Jim Hawkins, Earned Wages Access and the End of Payday Lending, 101 B.U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3514856 [https://perma.cc/NN2M-T6SH] (arguing 
that earned-wage programs are substantively superior to and have the ability to displace payday lenders, 
warranting a distinct regulatory framework that fosters the market’s growth but curbs risks of future 
market abuses). 
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assessment that earned-wage programs may constitute “credit” or “loans” 
under existing regulatory definitions,55 demonstrating that the risk-
management goals of lending laws would most effectively mitigate the risks 
associated with earned-wage programs in comparison to other existing 
frameworks. With some complementary but many substantively distinct 
findings and proposals, this Article and Professor Hawkins’s work open a 
dynamic conversation that encourages ongoing scholarship on earned-wage 
programs. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I gives an overview of the 
earned-wage market. It identifies the various business models, fee structures, 
and payment mechanics used by the major market participants. It then details 
the market’s impressive growth in five years’ time and the demographic 
profile of its predominantly low-income consumer base, demonstrating the 
importance of a scholarly focus on this emerging sector. The Part then ends 
with a detailed explanation of why early adopters use or, for employers, 
partner with these programs. 
Part II focuses on the regulatory gray area occupied by earned-wage 
programs. It identifies three potentially applicable legal frameworks derived 
from money-transmission law, nonbank-lending law, and the novel federal 
bank charter for nonbank financial institutions, known as the “FinTech 
charter,” and describes their relevant benefits and drawbacks. This Part 
highlights the fragmented nature of money-transmission and lending laws—
bifurcated between federal and numerous divergent state frameworks—
demonstrating that substantive consumer-protection regulations primarily 
exist at the state level and under numerous idiosyncratic frameworks. It 
explains that although the FinTech charter would preempt the patchwork of 
state laws that may stifle a national earned-wage market with inefficient 
compliance requirements, the charter fails to offer any consumer-protection 
regulations and is questionably viable in the long term. 
Part III argues that earned wage access programs have varying effects 
that sometimes perpetuate, and in some instances exacerbate, the very risks 
providers claim to eliminate when displacing short-term creditors like 
payday lenders. The Part begins by describing the practical and legal 
implications for the delayed-repayment mechanism in most earned-wage 
transactions. It asserts that by commodifying the time value of money, 
earned-wage transactions present consumer risks associated with 
nonpayment, information asymmetry, and intertemporal decision-making 
that are more common to the loan context than the money-transfer context. 
It then offers case law to show how courts could find earned-wage transfers 
 
 55 See id. at 33–41. 
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to constitute credit under certain lending laws. The Part lastly compares 
earned-wage programs to payday loans to illustrate how several of their 
similar features could exacerbate the risk of financial distress. It explains 
how risks may be heightened in the earned-wage context due to opaque 
pricing disclosure that inflates market rates and to employer-sponsored 
models that may result in inefficient contracts, notwithstanding the potential 
benefits of employer-gatekeepers. 
Part IV discusses how the consumer risks associated with earned-wage 
programs are currently unmitigated and require regulatory intervention. 
Specifically, the Part highlights how money-transmission law is wholly inapt 
to address the risks presented by the earned-wage market, how the 
multifarious nature of consumer-protection regulation at the state level 
would undermine the development of the market, and how the FinTech 
charter is insufficient, demonstrating the importance of a novel framework. 
Part V proposes a federal framework that would combine the consumer-
protection regulations relating to service terms, which are common under 
state law, with the benefits of federal uniformity. It concludes by considering 
potential counterpositions, including state-level efforts to regulate earned-
wage programs, and finds that the insufficiencies of state law combined with 
the need for nationwide business models bolster the attractiveness of the 
proposals recommended herein. 
I. EARNED-WAGE PROGRAMS: A PRIMER 
Earned-wage programs were developed by FinTech firms to 
revolutionize the market for small-sum liquidity solutions previously 
dominated by payday lenders and other high-cost creditors. Appearing for 
the first time in the mid-2010s,56 this niche market has rapidly grown into a 
multibillion-dollar industry. This Part provides an overview of the earned-
wage program product and its market. 
 
 56 See, e.g., Evolution of Pay, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/evolution-of-pay/ 
[https://perma.cc/L8VK-7F8E] (showing that PayActiv founded its earned-wage program in 2012 and 
launched its first service in 2014); The DailyPay Movement, DAILYPAY, https://www.dailypay. 
com/movement [https://perma.cc/WP47-GYLT] (showing that DailyPay launched its first service in 
2015); Our Story, EVEN, https://even.com/why-even/our-story [https://perma.cc/MXA3-BRSA] 
(showing that Even was founded in 2014); Sage Lazzaro, This App Promises Easy Cash, but It’s a 
Security Nightmare Waiting to Happen, MEDIUM (Dec. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/this-app-
promises-easy-cash-but-its-a-security-nightmare-waiting-to-happen-9b5758f91d23 [https://perma.cc/ 
23QU-NKD9] (showing that Earnin was launched publicly under the name ActiveHours in 2014). 
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A. The Product 
Earned-wage programs are mobile- and internet-based services that 
enable users instantly to access cash from their earned-but-unpaid wages. 
This is accomplished by one of three methods. First, there are integrated 
employer-sponsored programs where providers are given direct access to the 
employer’s payroll system, enabling providers to automatically cull data 
from payroll and time-entry systems to calculate wages accrued to date.57 
Second, there are nonintegrated employer-sponsored programs in which 
providers are sent copies of time-sheet records by employers rather than 
having direct access to payroll systems.58 Finally, there are third-party 
programs which do not partner with employers; instead, they collect records 
from the employee.59 Such records include bank data, pay stubs, and, from 
salaried workers, mobile location tracking data to confirm daily work 
commutes.60 
In each case, the program analyzes payroll data using various 
algorithms to calculate the dollar value of accrued wages, often net of 
estimated payroll deductions (e.g., taxes and garnishments), in a given pay 
period.61 This value is the sole basis from which earned-wage programs set 
permissible transfer amounts. Some programs allow users to transfer the full 
amount of this value,62 while other programs set caps to avoid zero-dollar 
paychecks at the end of a scheduled pay period.63 Some caps may be a 
percentage of earned wages,64 while others are flat per-transaction or pay-
period caps.65 The program does not consider existing debt obligations or 
 
 57 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 20.  
 58 See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, EVEN, https://even.com/legal/basic-and-plus-terms 
[https://perma.cc/NHR5-J649] (requiring documentation of employees’ hours worked during the wage 
period in question). 
 59 See, e.g., Farivar, supra note 32 (“Earnin users verify their employment by sharing their GPS 
location and allowing the app to access their bank account, to show that they are working regularly and 
that paychecks are coming in. If the income is irregular, users may be asked for pay stubs.”). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See Demystifying Earned Wage Access, EVEN (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.even.com/blog/demystifying-earned-wage-access [https://perma.cc/Y764-R3CA] (noting 
that the program “limit[s] how much of the available net pay an employee can advance, which ensures 
there’s a buffer for deductions and garnishments at the end of the pay period”). 
 62 DailyPay Frequently Asked Questions, ADP MARKETPLACE, https://d3bql97l1ytoxn. 
cloudfront.net/app_resources/221925/documentation/719560_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39Z-5PBG]. 
 63 See Kauflin, supra note 8.  
 64 Pete Isberg, Early Access to Earned Wages vs. Payday Lending, BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 26, 2019, 
4:01 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/payroll/early-access-to-earned-wages-vs-payday-lending 
[https://perma.cc/XX2N-GKWV]. 
 65 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, EVEN, https://even.com/faq [https://perma.cc/NS8S-
CKBP] (stating that Even app users can take out up to 50% of their earnings at that point in the pay 
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credit score when setting transfer amounts. And such amounts can be near 
instantly available in a user’s bank account, payroll card, prepaid debit card, 
or bill-pay recipient.66 
The funding source of earned-wage transfers are primarily the FinTech 
providers67 and, in a minority of cases, the employers.68 Earned-wage 
providers are fully reimbursed for transfers via automatic deductions that are 
assessed on the user’s wages on the user’s standard payday.69 For some 
employer-sponsored programs, the employer facilitates reimbursement 
through a payroll deduction before transferring the balance of net wages to 
the employee.70 Other programs may require the employee to set up direct 
deposit with a bank account71 or reloadable debit card72 issued by the program 
provider. That account is then automatically debited on the user’s payday to 
reimburse the earned-wage program before making the balance of the direct 
 
period); How Much Money Can I Cash Out with Earnin?, EARNIN, https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-
us/articles/223440348-How-much-money-can-I-cash-out-with-Earnin- [https://perma.cc/VM5N-72VN] 
(showing that Earnin has a $100–$500 pay-period max). 
 66 See, e.g., DailyPay Instant Access to Earned Wages, ADP MARKETPLACE, https://apps.adp.com/ 
en-US/apps/221925/dailypay-instant-access-to-earned-wages [https://perma.cc/S5LJ-ST6C] (allowing 
employees to “transfer and receive their earnings immediately in their designated bank account or on any 
debit card or pay card”). Earned-wage providers often partner with credit-card-network providers to 
facilitate such real-time payment transfers. See, e.g., Immediate Announces New Integration with Visa 
Making Earned Wages Available to Workers in Real-Time, IMMEDIATE (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/immediate-announces-new-integration-with-visa-making-
earned-wages-available-to-workers-in-real-time-301132336.html [https://perma.cc/2MPG-SUPL] 
(announcing the partnership between Visa and Immediate, a financial wellness company, which uses Visa 
Direct for its earned wage access services); Michael Moeser, Clair Teams with Mastercard to Expand 
Earned Wage Access, PAYMENTSSOURCE (Feb. 9, 2021, 9:00 AM) https://www.paymentssource.com/ 
news/clair-teams-with-mastercard-to-expand-earned-wage-access [https://perma.cc/EH5R-4WMJ] 
(reporting the partnership between Mastercard and Clair to facilitate the latter’s earned wage access 
services). 
 67 See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (“PayActiv is reimbursed by the employer by deduction from 
the employee’s next paycheck.”).  
 68 Eric Dresdale, Giving Employees Early Access to Their Earned Wages, PAYMENTS J. (Nov. 29, 
2017), https://www.paymentsjournal.com/giving-employees-early-access-earned-wages/ [https://perma. 
cc/9ZUU-CFRX]. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (“PayActiv is reimbursed by the employer by deduction from 
the employee’s next paycheck.”). 
 71 See, e.g., Terms and Privacy, DAILYPAY, https://www.dailypay.com/legal/#terms-of-use 
[https://perma.cc/9Z2K-P5CV] (“You will receive a DailyPay Routing and Account Number from us for 
an account that we establish for your participation in the DailyPay Program. You agree to make direct 
deposit arrangements with the Hiring Entity using your DailyPay Routing and Account Number as the 
account of record in the Hiring Entity’s payment system. You agree to instruct the Hiring Entity to direct 
all of your net regular pay to that account, and you authorize us to convey such instructions to the Hiring 
Entity on your behalf.”). 
 72 See, e.g., Gurley, supra note 36. 
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deposit available to the employee.73 For third-party programs, the user 
facilitates reimbursement on the user’s next payday via a preauthorized EFT 
from a linked, third-party bank account.74 The reimbursement obligation is 
often not legally compelled, since many providers consider earned-wage 
transfers nonrecourse obligations.75 However, some providers, such as 
DailyPay, make payroll deductions or preauthorized debits effectively 
irrevocable.76 Other providers give users the right to revoke and delay 
authorizations, but users never exercise it.77 
Users and their employers have four different fee structures in earned-
wage programs to consider.78 First, there are per-transaction fees ranging 
from $1.99 to $5, which can vary based on the desired speed of the transfer.79 
Second, there are per-pay-period fees requiring a single charge of, in some 
instances, around $5, which allows multiple transfers within one pay 
period.80 Third, there are subscription fees, which range from $6 to $8 per 
month and incur a single monthly charge for multiple transfers within the 
 
 73 See, e.g., Terms and Privacy, supra note 71. 
 74 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65 (explaining that “either a deduction will come 
out of your next paycheck for the amount of the Instapay OR your connected bank account will be debited 
for that amount on your next payday”); Terms and Privacy, EARNIN, https://earnin.com/privacyandterms 
[https://perma.cc/JR25-FAGJ]; How Does the App Work?, EARNIN, https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-
us/articles/213412087-How-does-the-app-work- [https://perma.cc/T7JR-D2C7] (instructing Earnin users 
to send earnings by sending an electronic timesheet or add earnings automatically via the app’s Automatic 
Earnings feature). 
 75 An obligation is “nonrecourse” when the obligee is barred from taking legal action to collect any 
of the obligor’s assets in the event of a default. See Hayashi, supra note 41; see, e.g., Terms and Privacy, 
supra note 74 (“We will have no legal or contractual claim or remedy against you based on your failure 
to repay . . . .”); Terms and Privacy, supra note 71 (“Our right to receive your Daily Earnings is non-
recourse.”); Branch Terms of Service, BRANCH (Feb. 2021), https://www.branchapp.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/JBH7-TFB5] (“Branch will not . . . engage in debt collection activities related to an 
[earned-wage access] that is not repaid . . . .”). 
 76 See, e.g., Terms and Privacy, supra note 71 (“You will not take any action or make any omission 
(including redirecting payments, or placing or allowing placement of a lien or security interest on any 
Daily Earnings) that has, individually or in the aggregate, an adverse effect on our ability to collect on or 
retain any Daily Earnings . . . .”). 
 77 Hawkins, supra note 54, at 22–23 (discussing an interview with representatives from Even).  
 78 Fees are typically paid solely to the earned-wage provider. One can imagine a scenario in which a 
competitive market will result in kickbacks to employers to incentivize partnerships, which would raise 
significant labor-law concerns. Since such kickbacks do not appear to be the current practice, the likely 
risks related thereto are outside of the scope of this Article. 
 79 See Frequently Asked Questions, DAILYPAY, https://www.dailypay.com/frequently-asked-
questions/ [https://perma.cc/VZ8N-57C7] (“We only apply a small fee when you request money ahead 
of your regular payday.”).  
 80 LESLIE PARRISH, AITE GRP., EMPLOYER-BASED LOANS AND EARLY PAY: DISRUPTION REACHING 
SCALE 14 (2019) (reporting that PayActiv fees include “$5 per biweekly pay period of active use”). 
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month.81 Subscription fee services are paid on an automatic schedule, 
meaning that if the service is not used for two months, some providers will 
cancel the automatic payments going forward.82 For employer-sponsored 
programs, employers can cover or subsidize the fees.83 Some employers, like 
Walmart, cover the costs for a limited number of transfers annually.84 
Finally, there is a free service,85 which does not compel payment but 
encourages users to “tip” the community.86 The program will provide tip 
suggestions such as $9 for a $100 withdrawal, but users can voluntarily “tip” 
any amount up to $14 for each transaction.87 Though “voluntary,” opting out 
of a tip may result in more limited access, including a limit on the maximum 
amount that a user can transfer.88 
 
 81 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65 (“Instapay allows you access to wages you’ve 
already earned, so you’re not borrowing. There are no taxes or interest - the only cost is our monthly Even 
Plus subscription.”).  
 82 Juliana Feliciano Reyes, Why Some Workers Think Walmart’s Pay-in-Advance App Is a Lousy 
Deal, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/walmart-pay-in-
advance-app-fees-20180828.html [https://perma.cc/48DP-9ZNM]. 
 83 See, e.g., HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (“According to [PayActiv], in over 50% of the cases the 
membership fee is borne or subsidized by the employers . . . .”); see also Dresdale, supra note 68 
(discussing the different payment models, which include mandatory employer payment (Instant 
Financial), mandatory employee payment (DailyPay), and optional employer payment (InstantWage)).  
 84 See Walmart Offers New Financial Wellness Services for Associates Nationwide, WALMART (Dec. 
13, 2017), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2017/12/13/walmart-offers-new-financial-wellness-
services-for-associates-nationwide [https://perma.cc/G5G8-6VDT] (explaining that Walmart will pay for 
employees to use an early wage access program up to eight times per year). 
 85 A recent trend that should be examined in future work is providers offering free earned wage 
transfer services to users that elect to link earned-wage transfers to provider-issued debit cards, which 
allow providers to generate revenues from interchange fees. 
 86 See How Does Earnin Make Money?, EARNIN, https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-
us/articles/223329928-How-does-Earnin-make-money- [https://perma.cc/PUP8-ZX6H] (“It is our 
community members, however, that we truly rely on to keep the app going. Earnin is 95% community-
supported and mainly operates on the tips we receive from our community members.”). 
 87 See Steve Nicastro & Annie Millerbernd, Earnin App 2020 Review: Get an Advance on Your 
Paycheck, NERDWALLET (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/earnin-personal-loan-
review/ [https://perma.cc/FXD6-EWAA] (“Earnin doesn’t charge interest or fees. Users can donate an 
optional ‘tip’ of any amount . . . . [up to] $14.”). 
 88 Complaint, supra note 43, at 23 (“[Plaintiff] believes that his limit was affected by the amount that 
he tipped. For example, his limit was once decreased from $350 to $250 in a single pay period, which 
followed a week when he had declined to pay a tip.”); Kevin Dugan, Cash-Advance App Earnin Changes 
Its Tune amid NY Probe, N.Y. POST (Sept. 1, 2019, 9:29 PM) https://nypost.com/2019/09/01/cash-
advance-app-earnin-changes-its-tune-amid-nys-probe/ [https://perma.cc/57MR-RJMQ] (reporting that 
the pay-to-play feature offered “as much as 10 times more in loans to users who voluntarily tipped,” but 
it was quietly disabled only after a state regulatory probe into possible violations of New York’s usury 
laws and only for New York users). But see Why Did My Max Decrease?, EARNIN, 
https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-us/articles/226633287-Why-did-my-Max-decrease- 
[https://perma.cc/3XXP-V7AS] (“Tipping does not affect your individual Cash Out Max, whether you 
decide to provide Earnin tips or not.”).  
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While each fee appears low, when converted into an APR to compare 
earned-wage programs to traditional loan products, earned-wage fees are 
extraordinarily high. For example, the per-transaction fee models can result 
in APRs between 145% and 365% or more if transfers are made closer to the 
user’s next payday.89 Under the tip-based model, the $9 recommendation 
results in an APR of 469% for a one-week advance.90 Even the more 
affordable programs can result in APRs of around 73% with frequent use,91 
which is more than double the rate of a typical credit-card service.92 
B. The Market 
1. The Providers 
The nascent market for earned-wage programs has grown rapidly and 
is occupied by several firms, including PayActiv, DailyPay, Even, and 
Earnin. Firms in this market are typically nonbank entities and thus hold no 
money for deposit.93 However, many are well funded through multimillion-
dollar venture-capital raises.94 Such funding has supported a rapidly 
 
 89 Notably, APRs are very difficult to pin down in this sector since it depends on the amount 
transferred and the number of days left until the user’s next payday. This range estimate assumes a two-
week pay cycle and uses a $100 transfer with repayment in five days. 
 90 Kevin Dugan, Popular Cash Advance App Earnin Operating in Payday Loan ‘Gray Area,’ Critics 
Claim, N.Y. POST (Mar. 21, 2019, 10:05 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/03/21/popular-cash-advance-app-
earnin-operating-in-payday-loan-gray-area-critics-claim/ [https://perma.cc/5G45-Q7TB]. 
 91 This calculation is based on the Even app, assuming a bimonthly pay period and $150 transfers on 
day five and day twenty-five with payday following five days after each transfer date. Because the $6 fee 
is for all transfers in the month, the first transfer is effectively amortized—$150 is ultimately repaid in 
twenty days at a $6 charge. COVID-19 Update: Get Paid Weekly with Free Even Plus, EVEN, 
https://www.even.com/Walmart [https://perma.cc/T92S-38PV] (noting Even Plus’s subscription fee is $6 
per month). 
 92 Lorie Konish, This ‘Deal’ Could Cost You 27.5 Times More Interest. Here’s What to Avoid When 
Shopping This Season, CNBC (Dec. 24, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/24/deferred-
interest-deals-and-store-credit-cards-could-cost-you-big-time.html [https://perma.cc/5GR7-9WDU] 
(“The average store credit card has a 28.86% APR, according to WalletHub. In contrast, the average 
credit card APR for individuals with good credit is 20.94% . . . .” (citing Alina Comoreanu, Credit Card 
Landscape Report, WALLETHUB (Oct. 17, 2019), https://wallethub.com/edu/cc/credit-card-landscape-
report/24927/ [https://perma.cc/5PKP-QXYB])).  
 93 See, e.g., Lauren Perez, How to Get Your Paycheck in Advance, MAGNIFY MONEY (May 31, 2019), 
https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/banking/paycheck-advance/ [https://perma.cc/P9KY-4KD9] 
(explaining that “Earnin is not a bank account”). 
 94 For example, Earnin has raised more than $190 million in venture funding. Earnin, CRUNCHBASE, 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/activehours [https://perma.cc/LE8Q-JLW7]. DailyPay has 
raised over $5 million. DailyPay, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/dailypay-
inc#section-funding-rounds [https://perma.cc/DE8G-77C5]. PayActiv has raised $20 million. PayActiv 
Raises $20 Million to Expand Financial Wellness Offering for Millions of Financially Stressed Workers, 
PAYACTIV (Oct. 10, 2018) [hereinafter PayActiv Raises $20 Million], https://www.payactiv.com/20-
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expanding market. Earned-wage providers have secured partnerships with 
hundreds of thousands of firms, including direct partnerships with large-
scale employers like Walmart95 and Amazon,96 and partnerships with large-
scale human-resource management firms like ADP Marketplace,97 Paycor,98 
and Kronos.99 Despite the market’s infancy, its activity is significant. 
PayActiv has alone settled more than $1 billion in transfers100 with a monthly 
transfer rate of over $100 million.101 One market-research firm estimated that 
employer-sponsored programs collectively facilitated 18.6 million transfers 
amounting to over $3.1 billion in 2018;102 this amount nearly doubled in 2019 
and tripled in 2020.103 Third-party programs have had similar success. Earnin 
has more than 10 million unique downloads104 and an estimated 375,000 
weekly active users.105 And the market, although nascent, is dynamic, with 
business models varying beyond fee structures and degree of integration with 
employers. Earned-wage providers often offer users an array of financial-
wellness tools, including discount programs, personal budgeting strategies, 
 
million-series-b-funding-expand-financial-wellness-offering/ [https://perma.cc/GHQ2-AB45]. Even has 
raised $40 million. Kauflin, supra note 8. 
 95 Tergesen, supra note 5. 
 96 Gurley, supra note 36. 
 97 DailyPay Instant Access to Earned Income, ADP MARKETPLACE, https://apps.adp.com/en-
US/apps/221925/dailypay-instant-access-to-earned-wages [https://perma.cc/2NH6-XTLW].  
 98 Mayuri Chaudhary, DailyPay Announces Partnership with Paycor, HR TECHNOLOGIST (June 20, 
2019), https://www.hrtechnologist.com/news/performance-management-hcm/dailypay-announces-partn 
ership-with-paycor/ [https://perma.cc/LEW7-EAN4]. 
 99 Kathryn Mayer, Kronos, Even Partner to Offer Employees Access to Advance Payday, EMP. 
BENEFIT NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.benefitnews.com/news/kronos-even-partner-to-offer-
employees-access-to-advance-payday [https://perma.cc/YY8X-JXTY]. 
 100 PayActiv Crosses $1 Billion in Processed Funds for Timely Earned Wage Access to the 





 101 PayActiv Raises $20 Million, supra note 94. 
 102 PARRISH, supra note 80, at 22.  
 103 Bernard, supra note 37 (“Last year, workers tapped their paychecks through workplace providers 
an estimated 37 million times, gaining access to more than $6 billion . . . .”); PARRISH, supra note 34, at 
3, 17. 
 104 Dugan, supra note 90 (“More than 10 million people have downloaded the [Earnin] app since it 
was first made available in 2013 . . . .”). 
 105 Kate Clark, Earnin Raises $125M to Help Workers Track and Cash Out Wages in Real Time, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/20/earnin-raises-125m-to-
help-workers-track-and-cash-out-wages-in-real-time/ [https://perma.cc/8VK9-VKZK]. 
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and automated savings.106 Some partner with payment-service providers to 
facilitate earned-wage transfers to reloadable debit cards.107 
2. The Users 
Data is scant for user demographics and transfer behavior. However, 
the limited information available suggests the typical user is a low-income 
individual who uses the service regularly for small-sum transfers. 
Considering wages offered by employer partners, the average earned-wage 
user’s income likely ranges from $20,000 to $30,000 annually.108 Average 
users transfer $66 to $165, depending on the program, up to three times in a 
biweekly pay period.109 Employees report using the funds to cover 
nonemergency expenses, such as recurring bill payments, commuting 
expenses, and food.110 Providers of earned-wage programs explicitly target 
low-income individuals who rely on fringe financial services like payday 
loans.111 While more data is needed on user demographics, the current data 
is at least consistent with the intended target market of earned-wage 
programs.  
 
 106 See, e.g., Kauflin, supra note 8 (describing the Even app’s three main features as “budgeting—it 
links to consumers’ bank accounts, pulls in income and expenses, asks about upcoming bills and estimates 
how much money they have left to spend,” “automatic savings,” and “a flexible-pay or ‘earned-wage’ 
option”).  
 107 See, e.g., Gurley, supra note 36 (“Warehouse workers who opt into [Amazon’s earned-wage] 
program, by signing up for a pay card with the software company Wisely, will have to pay fees at out-of-
network ATMs to take out cash, and may be subject to other fines.”). 
 108 See McDonalds Full Time Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/ 
Salaries/mcdonald-full-time-salary-SRCH_KO0,18.htm [https://perma.cc/SRA7-JTGJ] (estimating that 
most McDonald’s workers make just over $20,000 annually); Cameron Albert-Deitch, Time for That Pay 
Raise? Walmart Employees Now Make More than Minimum Wage, INC. (May 9, 2019), https://www. 
inc.com/cameron-albert-deitch/walmart-employee-compensation-report-minimum-wage.html [https:// 
perma.cc/V9D6-8X6] (stating that the average full-time Walmart associate makes $14.26 per hour, 
which, calculated as a salary for forty hours per week, is $29,660.80). 
 109 See Dailypay for ADP Workforce Now (Current) and ADP Vantage HCM & ADP Time-Clock 
(Future): Frequently Asked Questions, ADP [hereinafter Dailypay for ADP Workforce FAQs], 
https://d3bql97l1ytoxn.cloudfront.net/app_resources/221925/documentation/740545_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VZ6A-UGRV]; PARRISH, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing user data for several 
earned-wage programs). 
 110 Rafter, supra note 39 (reporting that, according to a DailyPay executive, “the top four things that 
people take money out to pay for are essentials that they might fall short paying for before their next 
paycheck, including food, housing or rent, transportation or gas, and utilities”); see also Del Valle, supra 
note 6; Tergesen, supra note 5 (stating that a customer reports “typically us[ing] PayActiv once or twice 
per pay period, generally for bills due before her next paycheck arrives”). 
 111 See, e.g., Insights Team, The Truth About Payday Loans, PAYACTIV (June 13, 2019), https:// 
www.payactiv.com/blog/the-truth-about-payday-loans/ [https://perma.cc/K9T8-A8Y4] (comparing the 
“vicious cycle and financial pitfall” that payday loans can cause employed persons “living paycheck to 
paycheck” versus the “responsible financial practices” fostered by an earned-wage program). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1526 
C. The Benefits 
Preliminary research has found that earned-wage programs are win-win 
solutions for employers and low-income employees. For employees, earned-
wage programs help manage income volatility by providing near-instant 
access to liquidity that would otherwise be held up by the employer until 
payday. Historically, low-income borrowers have placed a high premium on 
easy access to funds, flat fees, and privacy,112 all of which are provided by 
earned-wage programs. So long as they have accrued wages, users are able 
to access the programs and funds from their mobile devices at any time of 
any day. Unlike some mainstream credit services like personal loans, earned-
wage programs do not inquire about uses of funds. Users can quickly access 
cash without needing to rely on relatives or turning to mainstream financial 
institutions to resolve their financial shortfalls. Given that low-income 
borrowers tend to distrust mainstream financial institutions,113 they may be 
comforted by the fact that earned-wage programs are provided by nonbank 
FinTech firms. In short, earned-wage programs appeal to low-income 
consumers in many of the same ways that payday loans do.114 Moreover, 
earned-wage programs in many ways offer significant improvements over 
payday loans: they can be less expensive,115 they limit over-indebtedness by 
allowing transfers of only accrued wages, and they offer tools that help users 
self-manage their finances.116 
These user benefits are then passed on to employers. Research shows 
that workers who are financially distressed are twice as likely to lose more 
than three hours per week of productivity.117 Such workers are also more than 
 
 112 GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: 
AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 51–53 (2001). 
 113 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/ 
2017execsumm.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9JE-HXM5] (“Almost one-third (30.2 percent) of unbanked 
households cited ‘Don’t trust banks’ as a reason for not having an account, the second-most commonly 
cited reason.”). 
 114 See Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks End Cycles of Debt?, 42 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 659, 670 (2008) (“[A]pproximately 60% of customers cited the easy process for obtaining funds 
as the most important reason for selecting payday loans over other potential sources of credit.”). 
 115 Baker, supra note 30, at 2; see also Tergesen, supra note 5 (“[A] medication technician . . . says 
PayActiv has helped her avoid late and overdraft fees of as much as $80 a month.”).  
 116 Holly Johnson, Is Walmart’s Early Pay Offer Good for Workers?, POLICYGENIUS (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://www.policygenius.com/blog/walmart-offers-early-pay-feature-but-is-it-a-good-idea/ 
[https://perma.cc/97GT-XVBH ] (listing the pros of receiving an early paycheck, which include avoiding 
more expensive loans and bank overdrafts and temporarily solving cashflow issues). 
 117 KENT E. ALLISON & AARON J. HARDING, PWC, EMPLOYEE FINANCIAL WELLNESS SURVEY 2017 
RESULTS 5 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-company-services/publications/assets/pwc-
2017-employee-wellness-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3DF-C3TQ]. 
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twice as likely to switch jobs.118 The combined loss of productivity and lower 
retention rates account for approximately 11% to 14% of a firm’s payroll 
expense, or almost $500 billion for corporate America as a whole.119 
According to the HKS 2018 Study, the regular use of earned-wage programs 
is strongly associated with reduced employee-turnover rates and significant 
cost savings for employers.120 And in recent market surveys of earned-wage 
users, most respondents indicated that earned-wage access motivated them 
to pick up more shifts and would be a key factor in their retention.121 Thus, 
for the employer, earned-wage programs are a low-cost solution to labor 
inefficiencies. This win-win result for employers and low-income employees 
has reportedly led to some “employees rely[ing] less on payday loans and 
bank overdrafts,”122 though precise numbers on such product switches remain 
elusive. The growth of the earned-wage market stems not only from its 
appeal to employers and employees but also, as is discussed next, from a 
current lack of governmental regulation. 
II. REGULATING EARNED-WAGE PROGRAMS 
Currently, there are no regulatory frameworks for financial services that 
explicitly contemplate earned-wage programs. Consequently, the market 
operates in a regulatory gray area between the frameworks for money-
transmission services and loan services. Though some service providers seek 
to create an entirely distinct financial service category,123 most have elected 
to operate under the framework for money-transmission services. However, 
money-transmission law imposes minimal restrictions on the service terms 
offered by providers. Consequently, some lawmakers and consumer-
protection groups argue that the more onerous frameworks for loan services, 
like nonbank-lending law, are more appropriate. This Part gives an overview 
of the three legal frameworks that potentially could apply to earned-wage 
 
 118 SALARY FIN., THE EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO FINANCIAL WELLNESS 16 (2019), https://resources. 
salaryfinance.com/hubfs/Campaigns/USGuide19/Employers_Guide_to_Financial_Wellness_2019_Sala
ry_Finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y4D-3VW8] (citing HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30). 
 119 Id. at 4. 
 120 HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (noting that, according to one model, such cost savings could 
amount to nearly $110 million annually).  
 121 New Study Reveals Strong Opportunity for Earned Wage Access, VISA (Sept. 11, 2020), 
https://www.hrdive.com/spons/new-study-reveals-strong-opportunity-for-earned-wage-access/584917/ 
[https://perma.cc/NM4D-KCKB] (noting a DailyPay study which found that 56% of users reported being 
motivated to pick up more shifts due to having access to their service and a Visa study which found that 
89% of workers would stay longer at a company that offered an earned-wage program as a benefit). 
 122 Tergesen, supra note 5.  
 123 See Wack, supra note 47. 
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programs: the relatively-light-touch money-transmission law, the more 
onerous yet multifarious nonbank-lending law, and the nationally uniform 
yet substantively hollow FinTech charter.  
A. The Law of Nonbank Money Transmitters 
Many providers of money-transmission services are nondepository, or 
nonbank, financial institutions that perform payment services or facilitate the 
exchange of funds between two parties. Western Union is the classic 
example of a money-transmission firm, but FinTech firms have 
reconceptualized the market to potentially include digital wallets like 
ApplePay, peer-to-peer payment services like Venmo, and even 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.124 The law of money transmitters is designed 
primarily to protect consumer funds that are temporarily in trust with the 
money transmitters,125 prevent money laundering,126 and safeguard consumer 
data.127 It does so in a highly fragmented fashion, with regulation and 
oversight bifurcated between federal and state laws. Such fragmentation 
results in a multitude of idiosyncratic definitions of money transmitters, 
compliance requirements, and registration or licensing fees. 
1. Federal Landscape 
At the federal level, the law of money transmitters focuses on 
preventing money laundering and protecting consumers’ nonpublic 
information. Money laundering occurs when a person or entity attempts to 
conceal the origin of illicit funds through multiple complex money 
transfers.128 Under the Bank Secrecy Act, money transmitters are required to 
register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and comply with 
regular reporting, monitoring, and recordkeeping requirements to diligently 
 
 124 See Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 113–18 (2013) 
(discussing how many innovative payment services have remote risks of loss since fund transfers are not 
meaningfully held in trust by payment intermediaries as in the case of traditional money transmitters like 
Western Union). 
 125 See id. at 115.  
 126 See 31 U.S.C. § 5311; see also FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T 
NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/fincens-mandate-congress 
[https://perma.cc/7SPB-R2UP] (“The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 . . . 
requires U.S. financial institutions to assist U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent money 
laundering.”).  
 127 See Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards Rule, FTC 
(Apr. 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/financial-institutions-customer-
information-complying [https://perma.cc/ZG3J-NG3Z]. 
 128 FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MONEY LAUNDERING PREVENTION: A 
MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS GUIDE 2, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/prevention_gui
de.pdf [https://perma.cc/H85Z-EG3N].  
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track sources of funds.129 The definition of a money transmitter under the 
Bank Secrecy Act is broad,130 but the Act explicitly carves out exceptions 
where the risk of money laundering is remote, such as, for example, when 
the transaction is simple and easy to trace or the parties are otherwise 
regulated. These exceptions include transmission services for the direct 
purchase of goods and services and transactions between institutions 
regulated under the Bank Secrecy Act and other heavily regulated entities 
like securities brokers.131 
Money transmitters are also subject to financial-privacy and data-
security regulations. Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, money 
transmitters must provide consumers with certain privacy disclosures and the 
ability to opt out of information sharing.132 And in accordance with the 
Safeguards Rule promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (the 
Safeguards Rule), money transmitters must also establish and maintain 
safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of consumer 
information.133 
Federal law is otherwise silent on consumer protection with respect to 
domestic money transmitters.134 Some money transmitters may be subject to 
certain disclosure requirements and compelled to assist consumers in 
recovering funds in unauthorized transfers, but such requirements are 
applicable only if the money transmitter stores consumer funds (e.g., prepaid 
debit cards).135 
2. State-Level Landscape 
State law supplements the federal framework with consumer-protection 
regulation designed to protect consumers against loss by combating fraud 
and ensuring money transmitters are solvent. Money transmitters are 
required to obtain a license in each state where they operate, subject to carve-
outs and exemptions determined by the definition of money transmission on 
 
 129 See 31 U.S.C. § 5311; 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.11, 21.21 (2004).  
 130 See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i) (2019) (describing any person that (A) “accept[s] . . . currency, 
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of currency, 
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means” or 
(B) “engage[s] in the transfer of funds”). 
 131 Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii), (ff)(8). 
 132 15 U.S.C § 6801(a)–(b); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A); 16 C.F.R §§ 313.4–.9 (2016).  
 133 16 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2019). 
 134 The CFPB has amended the Electronic Fund Transfers Act with comprehensive consumer 
protections for remittance transfers sent by consumers in the United States to individuals and businesses 
in foreign countries. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.1, 1005.30–.36 (LEXIS through Fed. Reg. Dec. 10, 2020).  
 135 15 U.S.C.S. § 1693 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-220); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (LEXIS through 
Fed. Reg. Dec. 10, 2020).  
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a state-by-state basis.136 Licensing forces money transmitters to undergo a 
vetting process that assesses, among other things, their financial 
responsibility and experience, competence and character, and general 
fitness.137 Licensing also comes at a significant cost, with money transmitters 
paying an array of fees in each state where they operate.138 
In addition to the licensing process, money transmitters must comply 
with certain obligations to consumers. To ensure solvency, state law often 
requires that money transmitters provide a surety bond, satisfy a minimum-
net-worth requirement, and/or maintain consumer funds in a minimum 
amount of permissible investments.139 Money transmitters may also be 
required to file annual financial reports and submit to audits by state 
regulators.140 Authorized distributors of money transmitters are often also 
subject to regulation meant to prevent consumer loss.141 These state 
requirements are reinforced by federal law, which makes it a criminal offense 
to conduct money-transmission services without an applicable state 
license.142 
B. The Law of Nonbank Lenders 
Some nonbanks specialize in lending rather than (or sometimes in 
addition to) money-transmission services. Commonly known nonbank 
lenders include payday lenders,143 but technological advances have expanded 
the concept of nonbank lenders to include a host of FinTech firms called 
marketplace lenders that offer mainstream lending services.144 The law of 
nonbank lenders is designed to protect consumers against risks associated 
with over-indebtedness, undue loss, and privacy breaches. As with money 
transmitters, regulation of nonbanks lenders is fragmented across the federal 
and state level. However, nonbank lenders are subject to considerably less 
 
 136 Tu, supra note 124, at 92. See id. at 86–91 for detail on the variance in state law definitions of 
money transmission and exemptions. 
 137 Id. at 92. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 93.  
 140 Judith Rinearson, Regulation of Electronic Stored Value Payment Products Issued by Non-banks 
Under State “Money Transmitter” Licensing Laws, 58 BUS. L. 317, 321 (2002). 
 141 Many states require contractual arrangements between money transmitters and authorized 
distributors to compel immediate delivery of proceeds to the money transmitter. Id. at 322. 
 142 18 U.S.C.S. § 1960 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-220). 
 143 See Jayne Munger, Note, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-a-Bank and 
Rent-a-Tribe Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 468, 472 n.16 (2019) (providing 
payday lenders, pawnshops, and rent-to-own stores as examples of nonbank lenders). 
 144 John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 17, 26–27 (2016). 
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federal oversight than money transmitters and considerably more restrictions 
on their terms of service. 
1. Federal Landscape 
At the federal level, the law of nonbank lenders focuses on protecting 
consumers by regulating the process, or how loan services are offered. 
Nonbank lenders are thus subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the 
Safeguards Rule, as well as laws like the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 
which requires lenders to provide full disclosure of the total finance charges 
and a calculation of the APR for each extension of credit.145 TILA was 
intended to incentivize price competition not by setting rate caps but by 
enabling price comparisons between substitute credit products that were 
otherwise marketed along varying price schemes.146 Prior to its enactment, 
the cost of credit was obscured by disparate price-disclosure requirements 
across lenders, resulting in anticompetitive fees to consumers.147 TILA made 
more clear the true costs of lending services across competitors, resulting in 
a market-wide reduction in fees where the law was effectively 
implemented.148 Other laws and regulations that affect the process of and 
access to lending services include those that prohibit lenders from 
discriminating on the basis of a protected class149 and those that compel 
lenders to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information provided to 
credit bureaus.150 
 
 145 PAUL BARRON & DAN ROSIN, 1 FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE AND MORTGAGE 
LENDING § 10:7 (4th ed. 2020). 
 146 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-223) (“[C]ompetition among the 
various . . . firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use 
of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the 
purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be 
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him . . . .”). 
 147 See Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated 
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1664–65 (2006) (noting that, prior to TILA, 
consumers could not compare rates calculated by varying pricing methods because the process required 
complex calculations, meaning that price shopping was difficult and lenders with the lowest rates failed 
to effectively communicate those rates to consumers). 
 148 See id. at 1664–65, 1664 n.99 (explaining that TILA supplied information consumers needed to 
compare loan prices and thus lowered transaction costs). 
 149 See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (implemented by 12 C.F.R. § 202(m)) 
(prohibiting discrimination with respect to a credit transaction “on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex or marital status, . . . [and] age,” the use of public assistance programs, or the exercise 
of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968).  
 150 Lender compliance is indirectly compelled via legislation that requires credit-rating agencies to 
ensure consumer-credit reports are complete and accurate. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681. 
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Federal law rarely places limitations on the specific terms of credit 
services, such as pricing, principal amounts, or collection terms. Indeed, 
despite the CFPB’s broad authority to prevent “unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive . . . practice[s]”151 in the provision of loan services, regulatory 
proposals for small-loan services governing specific loan terms—i.e., 
service-term regulation—have faced significant opposition.152 CFPB rules 
aimed at heightening underwriting requirements, restricting collection 
practices, and limiting repeated use of loan services, were first delayed and 
then significantly scaled down; yet, even the narrow rule that focuses 
exclusively on collection practices continues to face legal threats.153 
Moreover, the CFPB is expressly barred from regulating pricing terms.154 
There are limited exceptions to this hands-off approach to service-term 
regulation, including restrictions on wage assignments,155 maximum interest-
rate limits that are tethered to state-established usury limits,156 and usury 
limits specifically for loan services to military personnel and their 
dependents.157 Otherwise, the regulatory burden and oversight at the federal 
level is relatively light for nonbank lenders. 
2. State-Level Landscape 
The light federal framework is nonetheless offset by the detail and 
variance of state law, which leads the charge on consumer-protection 
regulation related to loan-service terms. One of the oldest methods of 
protecting consumers from lenders is through usury laws that limit the 
 
 151 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1031(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a); 
see also id. § 1036(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (making it unlawful for covered persons and 
service providers “to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice”). 
 152 See Katherine Kirkpatrick, Andrew Michaelson & Steven Miller, Payday Lending May Face 
Greater CFPB Scrutiny Under Biden, LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2021) https://www.law360.com/ 
transportation/articles/1349609/payday-lending-may-face-greater-cfpb-scrutiny-under-biden [https:// 
perma.cc/HKH8-DBNW ] (summarizing the evolution of the Payday Rule, which was significantly scaled 
back under the Trump Administration and currently faces two federal challenges). 
 153 See id.; see also Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 1041.7–1041.9 (2020) (prohibiting lenders from attempting to debit repayment amounts from 
borrower bank accounts after two failed attempts and requiring notice for certain debit attempts). 
 154 See 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o). 
 155 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2014). 
 156 See Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 
(establishes criminal charges and treble-damage awards for interest rates on credit services that are twice 
the legal rate set by applicable state or federal law). 
 157 Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (“[C]reditor[s] . . . may not impose an annual 
percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit extended to a 
covered member or a dependent of a covered member.”). 
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interest and fees lenders may charge for their loan services.158 Usury laws 
initially operated to morally shame the practice of lending, but they were 
later adapted specifically to stigmatize high-cost lending.159 Today, usury 
laws are intended to protect unsophisticated and vulnerable borrowers from 
unfair loan terms that lead to inescapable cycles of debt.160 Each state has a 
usury statute, and no two statutes are the same. Interest-rate limits vary 
significantly, as do the types of fees regulated by each usury statute.161 Some 
states have no fee limits at all.162 
Many states also curb risks associated with habitual borrowing by 
restricting the number of high-cost loans that may be incurred within a short 
period of time.163 States can even minimize the burden of loan agreements on 
consumers by regulating terms like prepayment penalties164 and 
amortization.165 In addition, states limit any undue risk of loss to consumers 
in the event of default by regulating late penalties,166 the security that may be 
 
 158 See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services 
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury 
Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 657 (2000) (“Usury laws are, at core, the earliest form of 
consumer protection law.”). 
 159 See Kirby M. Smith, Banking on Preemption: Allowing National Bank Act Preemption for Third-
Party Sales, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1631, 1642–43 (2016); see also John D. Skees, The Resurrection of 
Historic Usury Principles for Consumption Loans in a Federal Banking System, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1131, 1140–48 (2006) (discussing the history and purpose of usury laws). 
 160 See Skees, supra note 159, at 1137–39; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ada v. Phares, 174 P. 519, 
520 (Okla. 1918) (per curiam) (asserting that state usury laws exist “to protect those whom necessity 
compels to borrow against the outrageous demands oftentimes made and required by those who have 
money to loan”). 
 161 See CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, GUIDE TO STATE USURY LAWS (2014), https:// 
www.cuna.org/uploadedFiles/Advocacy/Priorities/State_Government_Affairs/a-z_usury_lawguide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KZ9-NXBS] (displaying tables of the usury laws in each state); Lindsay VanSomeren, 
Usury Laws: What They Are and Why You Should Care, CREDIT KARMA (Nov. 6, 2020), 
https://www.creditkarma.com/personal-loans/i/usury-laws-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4WCL-S26U] (explaining that usury “laws are mostly regulated by individual states, which means they 
can be drastically different depending on where you live”). 
 162 Richie Bernardo, Usury Laws by State, Interest Rate Caps, the Bible & More, WALLETHUB (June 
20, 2014), https://wallethub.com/edu/cc/usury-laws/25568/ [https://perma.cc/292Z-ECT5]. 
 163 COLIN MORGAN-CROSS & MARIEKA KLAWITTER, EFFECTS OF STATE PAYDAY LOAN PRICE CAPS 
& REGULATION 3 (2011), https://evans.uw.edu/sites/default/files/public/STATE%20PAYDAY%20L 
OAN%20PRICE%20CAPS%20%26%20REGULATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP2R-BM3H]. 
 164 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5 (West 2020); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22400(a)(2), 22400(c), 
22402 (West 2020). 
 165 See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(2)(c) (McKinney 2012).  
 166 Amy Loftsgordon, If I’m Late on Mortgage Payments, What Fees Can the Lender Charge?, NOLO 
LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-fees-can-the-lender-charge-if-
im-late-mortgage-payments.html [https://perma.cc/5A79-8ZLZ]. 
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taken for loans,167 collection practices,168 confessions of judgment,169 and 
wage garnishments and assignments.170 In some instances, state efforts to 
protect consumers against fraud, over-indebtedness, undue loss, and privacy 
violations may be more restrictive for nonbank lenders that serve low-
income consumers, like payday lenders.171 
Similar to money transmitters, nonbank lenders must obtain a license in 
each state they operate in and comply with the oversight rules of the 
respective state regulators. State licensing requirements vary, with some 
states requiring a license for any consumer lending172 and others requiring a 
license only for consumer lending at certain interest rates,173 principal 
amounts, or for certain types of consumer loans.174 Many states have multiple 
license categories based on the type or size of loans. The conditions of 
licensing and ongoing compliance, including filing fees, recordkeeping, 
financial reporting, disclosure, minimum net worth, and surety-bond 
requirements, are similarly disparate.175 In sum, nonbank lenders with 
multistate operations have the difficult and often costly task of monitoring 
their compliance with many regulatory regimes. 
 
 167 Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect 
on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 526 (2004). 
 168 Id. at 526–27; see also N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 422 (McKinney 2020). 
 169 Schiltz, supra note 167, at 526–27; see also CAL. FIN. CODE § 22331 (West 2020) (“No licensee 
shall take any confession of judgment . . . .”). 
 170 See, e.g., Bradley A. Hansen & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Evolution of Garnishment and 
Wage Assignment Law in Illinois, 32 ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 19, 21–24 (2014) (exploring Illinois 
garnishment and wage-assignment regulations). 
 171 See Kelly D. Edmiston, Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt Consumers?, FED. RSRV. 
BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 31, 32 (2011) (discussing “the high cost of payday loans, the tendency for 
payday loans to contribute to consumer debt spirals, and the targeting of payday lending to financially 
vulnerable populations” as justification for additional regulation of payday lending). 
 172 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.510 (West 2020); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 1140-13.010 
(2006). 
 173 See, e.g., ROSS SPENCE, SNOW FOGEL SPENCE LLP, USURY AND HOW TO AVOID IT: IMPACT OF 
NEW LEGISLATION ON COLLECTION PRACTICES 16 (noting Texas triggers its license requirement for 
lenders charging interest rates above 10%). 
 174 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Licensing Information, MO. DIV. OF FIN., 
https://finance.mo.gov/consumercredit/licensing.php [https://perma.cc/QJX5-R368] (explaining that 
licensing is required for “retail credit institutions, motor vehicle time sales creditors, consumer credit 
lenders, consumer installment lenders, lenders of $500 or less (commonly called ‘payday lenders’)”). 
 175 See, e.g., THE SUR. & FID. ASS’N OF AM., SURVEY OF BOND REQUIREMENTS FOR MORTGAGE 
BROKERS AND LENDERS (2017), https://suretyone.com/pdf/all-bonds/mortgage-broker-surety-bond-
requirements-state-by-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA4N-C44S ] (describing the variegated surety-bond 
requirements for each state). 
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C. The Law of FinTech: The FinTech Charter 
Some nonbanks may avail themselves of another regulatory framework 
designed specifically for FinTech firms. The law of FinTech seeks to 
regulate certain FinTech firms like banks by eliminating the need for 
compliance with differing state requirements in favor of more streamlined 
federal-level regulation. Specifically, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) established a special-purpose national-bank charter (the 
FinTech charter) for nonbank FinTech firms engaged in one of three 
activities constituting the “business of banking”: taking deposits, lending, 
and paying checks.176 The FinTech charter was intended to facilitate 
innovative service offerings on a national scale, enabling federal-level 
supervision and regulation similar to that enjoyed by national banks.177 The 
charter focuses on firm solvency, systemic risks, anti-money laundering, 
privacy, and credit risk management.178 While the specifics of FinTech 
supervision remain vague, capital and liquidity requirements,179 financial-
inclusion requirements,180 and safety-and-soundness standards181 are 
contemplated.  
 
 176 OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (2018), https:// 
www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RLH2-GZ7K]; see also OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S 
LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (2018), https://occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-
licensing-manual/files/considering-charter-apps-from-fin-tech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/HV8R-
RHL6].  
 177 OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology 
Companies, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (July 31, 2018) [hereinafter OCC News 
Release], https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma. 
cc/XH67-DCA3].  
 178 See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2020 BANK SUPERVISION 
OPERATING PLAN (2019), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2019/2019-111a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/257Q-26FU] (setting forth bank-supervision operating plan for fiscal year 2020). While 
the specifics of FinTech supervision remain vague, the FinTech charter contemplates minimum capital 
and liquidity requirements and contingency-plan requirements, which are intended to protect against 
insolvency. FinTech firms would also be subject to narrowly tailored financial-inclusion requirements. 
See OCC News Release, supra note 177. 
 179 See OCC News Release, supra note 177. 
 180 Id. 
 181 OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK 
CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 1–2 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-
examination/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DN6W-GRPV] (“Where a law does not apply directly, the OCC may, nonetheless, work 
with a fintech company to achieve the goals of a particular statute or regulation through the OCC’s 
authority to impose conditions on its approval of a charter, taking into account any relevant differences 
between a full-service bank and special purpose bank.”).  
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A FinTech charter would not single-handedly clarify whether money-
transmission or lending laws apply to a chartered FinTech firm. The charter 
would, however, afford such firms the unique right to avoid the multitude of 
idiosyncratic state laws under the money-transmission or loan-services 
framework. Specifically, via the doctrine of preemption,182 chartered 
FinTech firms could be able to export the usury laws of the state where they 
are organized to any state where they conduct business.183 They could also 
avoid state-by-state licensing requirements, process-specific regulations like 
disclosure rules, and service-term restrictions like loan-to-value ratios, 
payment schedules, and amortization.184 Escaping state-level regulations 
would result in chartered FinTech firms being subject to very limited service-
term regulations, in favor of more “light touch” or vague regulations, which 
may not adequately protect consumers.185 
 
*          *          * 
 
As detailed above, earned-wage programs have in short order 
established a multibillion-dollar foothold in the market for small-dollar 
liquidity with minimal regulatory scrutiny. Proponents believe the “real 
time” wage-transfer model to be a superior alternative to high-cost credit like 
payday lending and an alternative that resolves employee liquidity crunches 
while improving employer bottom lines. And, perhaps most significantly, 
many proponents also believe this model to be legally distinct from such 
credit alternatives.  
Notwithstanding the benefits earned-wage programs promise, an 
assessment of the market reveals risks that existing regulatory frameworks 
prove inapt to mitigate. The basic transaction is in many ways eerily similar 
 
 182 See Michael Marvin, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on National Banks, 
The Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1811–14 (2016) (detailing 
how and why federal preemption of state law works to allow national banks to comply with the price-
related lending laws of only the state under which they are chartered). 
 183 Such flexibility was deemed necessary to facilitate the development of a “complex system of 
modern interstate banking.” Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 
439 U.S. 299, 312 (1978). Congress extended the exportation right to state-chartered banks. Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 132, 
164–65 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d). 
 184 Preemption rights for national FinTech firms remain uncertain. However, if they are to be treated 
like banks under the FinTech charter, these privileges are likely to be afforded to them. See generally 
Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act 
Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1280–81 (2011) (explaining the OCC’s 
enumerating lending regulations that would not apply to national banks). 
 185 See id. at 1285–86 (arguing that such light-touch regulation is easily subverted by national banks). 
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to a payday loan, which has such significant consumer risks that payday 
lenders have been labeled modern-day loan sharks.186 Payday borrowers have 
struggled to manage household expenses, maintain bank accounts, and even 
remain solvent.187 These harms have led nearly one-third of states and 
Washington, D.C. to prohibit payday lending.188 Federal law bans the 
issuance of payday loans to active military and their dependents.189 
Moreover, the CFPB recently enacted federal-level rules to curb some of the 
risks posed by payday loans offered to nonmilitary consumers190 and is 
speculated to pass more robust rules in the coming years.191  
Yet, earned-wage providers conveniently escape such rules and 
restrictions, and the heightened burden of their fragmentation, by operating 
as money transmitters. The question academics, regulators, and 
policymakers must ask themselves is twofold. First, if payday lenders are 
modern-day loan sharks, are earned-wage programs digital-era loan sharks? 
If so, consumers may be unduly exposed to the same risks these 
constituencies have endeavored to reign in for decades or worse—new, 
unimagined risks not previously addressed in the law. Second, if there is 
anything redeemable about the market, how should regulation be designed 
to effectively and efficiently protect consumers while fostering market 
competition and growth? 
 
 186 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 3. 
 187 See infra notes 275–282 and accompanying text.  
 188 Aliyyah Camp, Are Payday Loans Permitted in Your State?, FINDER (Apr. 27, 2020), 
https://www.finder.com/payday-loans-in-your-state [https://perma.cc/39P4-4SSU]; see also Rowan, 
supra note 28 (identifying the maximum allowed rate charged by payday loans per state).  
 189 See Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987; see also Aliyyah Camp, Can I Get a Short-Term Loan 
if I’m Active Duty or a Military Spouse?, FINDER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.finder.com/military-short-
term-loans [https://perma.cc/3X8E-X8G4] (explaining prohibitions on lenders making loans to military 
members and spouses under conditions usually used by payday lenders, including high interest rates and 
mandatory waivers of consumer-protection laws). 
 190 See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1041.7–1041.9 
(limiting consecutive attempts by lenders to withdraw repayment amounts from borrower accounts).  
 191 See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Orla McCaffrey, Banks Brace for Tougher Rules Under Biden on 
Consumer Protection, Fair Lending, WALL. ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2021, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-brace-for-tougher-rules-under-biden-on-consumer-protection-fair-
lending-11612022400 [https://perma.cc/6P76-9N6P] (speculating that the CFPB under the Biden 
Administration is likely to impose tougher rules on payday lenders, including revising the ability-to-repay 
requirement that was removed from the Payday Rule). 
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III. THE EARNED-WAGE PROBLEM 
This Part addresses the first of these questions. Legal scholars are only 
now beginning to critically analyze earned-wage programs.192 This Part 
identifies several risks of earned-wage programs by examining the key 
distinction between money transmissions and loans, the shared features of 
earned-wage programs and payday loans, and the practical effects of the 
employer-sponsored model. In doing so, it argues that some earned-wage 
programs can perpetuate, and in some instances exacerbate, the very risks 
providers claim to eliminate when displacing short-term creditors like 
payday lenders. 
A. Deferred Repayment Risks 
Unlike traditional money-transmission services, most earned-wage 
transactions are marked by a feature that has historically been associated 
with loans: deferred repayment.193 In transactions that defer repayment, the 
 
 192 To date, the only scholars who have engaged with this phenomenon in depth are the author and 
Professor Jim Hawkins. See Hawkins, supra note 54. Another scholar has considered the programs as a 
symptom of employers’ failure to pay wages more regularly. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Payday, 98 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2020). This work is at the intersection of two areas of legal academic literature. It expands 
on the bourgeoning financial technology scholarship that assesses the disruptive market and regulatory 
implications of innovative financial products. See generally, e.g., Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, 
Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019) (arguing that regulators are generally 
only able to accomplish two of three goals—providing clear rules, maintaining market integrity, and 
encouraging innovation—and proposing solutions to that “trilemma”); Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale 
& Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward 
Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499 (2019) (examining the technological innovations of 
FinTech firms, regulatory responses, and how to balance the benefits of FinTech against its dangers); 
Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018) 
(arguing that current policies and regulations are stifling innovation in FinTech); Christopher K. Odinet, 
Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781 (2018) (describing how FinTech functions 
and the consumer protections regulating the market). It also builds on the consumer-law scholarship that 
assesses the market and regulatory effects of consumer credit for predominately low- and moderate-
income consumers, which includes payday lending, title lending, and refund-anticipation loans. See 
generally, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Defaults on Payday Loans Matter? (Columbia L. & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 509, 2014) (analyzing effect of failing to repay payday loans on borrower’s credit scores); 
Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and 
Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2010) (examining attempts at regulation and consumer 
misunderstandings about payday loans); Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link 
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011) (disputing the assumption that 
“fringe credit” and financial distress are linked); Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 
102 J. FIN. ECON. 28 (2011) (examining the mitigating force of payday lenders after natural disasters and 
property crimes); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid 
Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012) (arguing that municipalities 
should require clear advertising of lending practices rather than eliminating payday lending altogether). 
 193 See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(j) (2013) (defining consumer credit, 
in part, as a transaction to “defer payment of a debt, incur debt and defer its payment”).  
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cost and benefit occur at different times. In the case of earned-wage transfers, 
many programs float (or advance) funds to workers and are reimbursed at a 
later date. Thus, as a technical matter, the benefit (instant liquidity) can occur 
days or weeks before the cost (reimbursement from wages) is due.194 The 
import of deferred repayment is that it results in repayment risks, information 
asymmetry, and intertemporal decision-making. 
First, deferred repayment transactions commodify the time value of 
money, purporting to provide consumers with immediate use of their future 
income while compensating providers for the opportunity costs of deferring 
alternative uses of their own funds.195 These transactions optimally operate 
as mechanisms for intertemporal and intrapersonal income redistribution for 
consumers (i.e., a cash trade-off with your future self) but only to the extent 
such future income contemplated under the terms of the transaction actually 
exists.196 If such future income does not manifest and a consumer is unable 
to repay a transaction on its terms, the deferred-repayment transaction can 
result in providers extracting significant income and wealth from 
consumers.197 
Second, providers and consumers will ideally enter deferred-repayment 
transactions when the risk-adjusted expected return exceeds expected 
costs.198 However, there are unique information asymmetries that can arise 
 
 194 Many earned-wage providers might suggest this technicality is practically insignificant since they 
float earned income rather than income to be earned in the future. As such, the transaction might more 
closely mirror, for example, an ATM withdrawal after bank business hours or on the weekend. In such 
instance, the ATM advances funds that are later settled during business hours. However, this view 
assumes that consumers’ behavioral responses to the “settlement” of funds on hand (as in the ATM 
context) will be akin to the settlement of anticipated funds (as in the earned-wage context). Also, the 
settlement time in the earned-wage context can be significantly longer than in the ATM context, likely 
contributing to a change in consumer behavior in such transactions. Finally, this view also assumes ATM 
charges are above reproach. If consumers were compelled to use ATM services in a habitual manner at 
the risk of financial distress, then the similar consumer effect would certainly warrant review.  
 195 Adam N. Hirsch, Getting What’s Due: Prejudgment Interest in Illinois, 98 ILL. BAR J. 412, 413 
(2010). 
 196 See Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1147–48 
(2019) (“A fundamental assumption of credit as a productive lever is that ‘[t]he borrower is borrowing 
from her much richer future self—a future self who is made much richer precisely because of the 
borrowed money.’” (quoting MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND 
THE PARADOX OF POVERTY 238 (2012))).  
 197 See, e.g., id. at 1102 n.34 (describing how payday loans are designed to maximize profits from 
the decision-making errors of economically vulnerable consumers). 
 198 See Thomas A. Durkin, Gregory Elliehausen & Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Credit and the 
American Economy: An Overview, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 279, 280–82 (2015) (discussing how most 
consumers decide to use credit to acquire assets—such as a vehicle or household appliances—that provide 
value, or returns, over time that exceed their costs and lenders decide to issue credit when the expected 
finance charge, or interest, earned exceeds the benefit of an alternative, immediate use of their resources). 
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to the detriment of both the provider and the consumer to undermine efficient 
markets. For providers, they may lack complete insight into the consumer’s 
risk of nonpayment; therefore, they use various sophisticated tools to better 
discern, mitigate, and price such risks, including consumer credit reports, 
financial records, alternative data, and collateral. For consumers, they often 
do not fully appreciate the costs of such transactions or the consequences of 
nonpayment.199 Indeed, the comparative costs between two deferred-
payment products often depend on sophisticated calculations involving the 
deferred amount, total fees, and repayment terms that vary innumerably 
between products. Consumers are often forced to rely on providers for clarity 
on costs; yet, opacity tends to benefit providers who are enabled to evade 
competing on price, resulting in inflated consumer costs.200 Similarly, the 
risks of nonpayment or delayed repayment are left to providers to disclose, 
but such terms are often not salient by design.201 In the absence of effective 
information sharing between providers and consumers, markets with 
deferred payments are ripe for inefficiencies that can undermine consumer 
well-being. 
Finally, even if information on deferred-payment products is effectively 
disclosed, consumers will have to exercise intertemporal decision-making—
discerning tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different points 
in time.202 Consumers, however, often struggle to make optimal 
intertemporal decisions, leaving them susceptible to anticompetitive and 
predatory market forces.203 Specifically, consumers are often biased toward 
the present, valuing instant gratification too highly in comparison to delayed 
 
 199 See Andrew T. Hayashi, Myopic Consumer Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 689, 691 (2020) (“Consumer 
debt often has a complex fee structure, opaque repayment terms, and default consequences that are hard 
to evaluate.”). 
 200 See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but 
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REGUL. 181, 192–98 (2008) 
(describing the complex interest pricing that consumers face); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the 
Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 811 (2006) 
(describing the imbalance of access to information between lenders and “vulnerable borrowers”). 
 201 See, e.g., Renuart & Thompson, supra note 200, at 196–97 (discussing how complex mortgage 
terms and superior lender knowledge regarding borrower default risk contribute to predatory lending that 
pushes borrowers into default and foreclosure). 
 202 See Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge 
Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 302 n.157 (2005) (“Delayed charges 
that . . . are not apparent at point-of-sale, like many ATM fees, do not have the same effect on consumer 
decisions as charges presented at point-of-sale, when the consumption decision is made.”). 
 203 See Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing, 
2 AM. ECON. J. 193, 195 (2010) (discussing present-biased hyperbolic discounting in credit-card 
markets). 
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gratification or subsequent costs.204 Such present bias can be particularly 
acute for low-income consumers, who consistently face immediate and 
urgent consumption needs while simultaneously balancing economic 
scarcity against day-to-day survival.205 In such instances, demand for 
deferred-payment products is often driven not by the costs for deferment but 
by an immediate personal need for the underlying good or service ultimately 
purchased.206 Such demand can also contribute to consumer failure to shop 
for the least costly sources of credit, which leads to high-cost borrowing or 
overborrowing, causing future liquidity crises as demonstrated in the payday 
loan context.207 The disaggregation of costs and benefits in deferred-payment 
transactions also increases the likelihood that a consumer may incorrectly 
predict their ability to timely meet their obligation or to manage shocks to 
their future income and consumption.208 Consequently, consumers are likely 
to disregard, underappreciate, or miscalculate pricing, repayment, and 
default terms, and therefore, such terms often warrant more direct regulation 
than disclosure requirements.209 
Irrespective of the form of the transaction, such disaggregation of costs 
and benefits has long been the de facto marker of a loan with accompanying 
loan-like risks.210 For example, when payday loans were similarly claimed to 
 
 204 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 36; see also OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 21–22 (2012). 
 205 See Shmuel I. Becher, Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case of High-
Cost Credit and Payday Loans 15 (Univ. San Diego Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 18-357, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3235810 [https://perma.cc/NT6Q-ZFER] (discussing how scarcity 
“directs people to further focus on present needs” in ways that are detrimental to their long-term interests). 
 206 See Hayashi, supra note 199, at 698 (“Preferences between goods and services at two different 
points in time are governed not by market rates of return but by the preferences of the individual herself. 
In contrast to preferences over cash flows, preferences over consumption at different points in time are 
unique to individuals and the goods and services under consideration.”); Scott Andrew Schaaf, From 
Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 344 (2001) 
(“Consumers are often convenience driven, not price driven, when choosing immediate consumption over 
delaying consumption.”). 
 207 See Schaaf, supra note 206, at 346 (describing overborrowing and eventual crises as loans 
aggregate). 
 208 Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting: 
Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default 2–3 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 08-33, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=1319751 [https://perma.cc/8NUX-YKGM]; 
Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for Low- and Middle-Income 
Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729, 746–47 (2012). 
 209 See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1641, 1660 (2014). 
 210 See Hurt v. Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co., 286 S.W. 1055, 1056–57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926) (noting 
that courts must “look beyond the form of a transaction” and determine that if there is a payment for “a 
loan or forebearance [sic] of money, [then] the parties are subject to the statutory consequences, no matter 
what device they may have employed to conceal the true character of their dealings” (emphasis added)). 
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be mere money-transmission services, specifically check-cashing services, 
courts relied on the inherent separation of costs and benefits in time to find 
that they were instead loans subject to TILA.211 TILA’s disclosure 
requirements are applicable to consumer credit, which is defined as “the right 
granted by a creditor to [a natural person] to defer payment of a debt, [or to] 
incur debt and defer its payment,”212 primarily for “personal, family, or 
household purposes.”213 Another court noted that payday lenders were 
“disbursing funds . . . on the promise of repayment of the sum plus the 
‘service charge,’ at a later time. If this is not an extension of credit, this Court 
finds it hard to imagine any transaction that is.”214 Even under state usury 
law, transactions where payment is delayed or the issuer otherwise forbears 
its right to collect payment constitute loans.215 Thus, it is plausible that a court 
would find that the standard earned-wage transfer constituted consumer 
credit under TILA or a loan under many state usury laws.216 
But even for deferred-payment services that may be exempt from TILA 
or otherwise carved out from traditional concepts of loan services—such as 
bank overdraft protection and rent-to-own service contracts—the risks of 
repayment, information asymmetry, and intertemporal decision-making are 
well documented by scholars.217 Thus, any regulation of earned-wage 
transfers should create safeguards to ameliorate these effects. 
B. Payday Loans 2.0 
While the deferred-repayment feature of earned-wage programs may 
resemble loans generally, earned-wage programs also contain features that 
more specifically align with payday loans. To appreciate the commonalities, 
it is important to understand what this Article refers to when discussing 
 
 211 Lisa Blaylock Moss, Note, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & 
the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1737–39 (2000). 
 212 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(j) (2013). 
 213 Id. § 202.2(h). 
 214 In re Miller, 215 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 215 See Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (2000) (“[The defendant] 
must show that [the plaintiff] made ‘a loan or forbearance of money, either express or implied.’ By 
agreeing not to cash [the defendant’s] checks until his payday, [the plaintiff] forbore its right to negotiate 
the checks.” (citation omitted) (quoting Hershiser v. Yorkshire Condo. Ass’n, 410 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1991))). 
 216 For TILA purposes, the remaining open question would be whether the earned-wage provider 
constituted a “creditor.” Because most providers offer earned-wage transfers as a core part of their 
services offerings, they would certainly meet the definition. See Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 
649–50 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 217 See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 200, at 185, 196–97; Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer 
Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1552–56 (2019). 
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payday loans. A payday loan is an unsecured personal loan extended in 
principal amounts that generally do not exceed $1,000.218 Each borrower’s 
past pay-stub data is used to limit the principal of her loan to an amount not 
more than such borrower’s typical wages in a pay period.219 Payday loans are 
nonamortizing term loans, which means they are one-time issuances payable 
in full with fees at maturity.220 Such loans mature within two to four weeks 
on the borrower’s next payday.221 They are effectively secured by a postdated 
personal check or EFT preauthorization, pursuant to which the payday lender 
may unilaterally debit amounts owed from the borrower’s bank account at 
maturity.222 Alternatively, a borrower can make the repayment in cash or, 
subject to an additional fee, extend or refinance the loan.223 The median fee 
for a payday loan and each related extension or refinancing is $15 per $100 
borrowed, extended, or refinanced.224 Payday loans are typically issued 
within minutes since lenders forgo in-depth reviews of borrower financial 
records and credit data from mainstream credit bureaus for scant reviews of 
 
 218 Chris Cirillo, Payday Loan Regulation: Any Interest?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 417, 419 
(2013) (“In a typical pay-day loan, a borrower borrows a principal of less than $1,000.”). 
 219 Hawkins, supra note 192, at 1394 (explaining the consumer paycheck is the cap on payday 
lending). 
 220 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA, REPORT 2: HOW BORROWERS 
CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 6 (2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/ 
02/20/pew_choosing_borrowing_payday_feb2013-(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/5NYF-EKTY] (describing 
payday loans as nonamortizing loans). 
 221 What Is a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/ [https://perma.cc/E469-
255F] (“A payday loan is usually repaid in a single payment on the borrower’s next payday . . . . The due 
date is typically two to four weeks from the date the loan was made.”). 
 222 See Kelly J. Noyes, Comment, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (“Payday loans are short-term loans in which a consumer receives cash in 
exchange for giving the lender a postdated check or electronic access to the consumer’s bank account for 
the amount of the loan and a finance fee.”). 
 223 See What Are the Costs and Fees for a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 5, 
2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-are-the-costs-and-fees-for-a-payday-loan-en-
1589/#:~:text=A%20fee%20of%20%2415%20per,Rollovers [https://perma.cc/T35D-LXKR]. 
 224 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO TITLE LOANS, AND HIGH-COST 
INSTALLMENT LOANS: HIGHLIGHTS FROM CFPB RESEARCH (2016), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Payday_Loans_Highlights_From_CFPB_Research.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8MGF-KVB7]; see also What Does It Mean to Renew or Roll Over a Payday Loan?, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 7, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-does-
it-mean-to-renew-or-roll-over-a-payday-loan-en-1573 [https://perma.cc/4BHQ-9MH6] (“If you roll over 
[a $300] loan[,] [for example], you pay . . . the $45 fee, and you have to repay the $300 plus another $45 
fee [when the extension is over].”). 
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nontraditional credit history, including repayment history for rent, utilities, 
and other payday loans.225 
Payday loans appeal to over 12 million consumers annually due to their 
ease of access, transparency of costs, and speed of funds.226 However, many 
policymakers, scholars, and consumer advocates fear payday loans create 
more harm than good. Over the past two decades, legal academics and other 
researchers have studied the effects of payday loans with varying 
conclusions. Some find that payday loans are a “better than nothing” 
liquidity solution with some positive effects despite their risks.227 Others find 
that payday loans have net-neutral effects on borrowers.228 Still, a significant 
body of work finds that payday loans exacerbate the financial woes of many 
borrowers.229 In this latter group, most of the negative consequences of 
payday loans are causally linked to or associated with three characteristics 
of payday loans: their high costs that drain limited resources, limited 
underwriting that results in repeated use, and credit invisibility that inhibits 
access to mainstream services. Because the earned-wage market features 
many of the same characteristics as payday loans, it is probable that the 
market exposes consumers to similar risks. 
 
 225 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 9 (finding that consumers only need to present a driver’s license, 
pay stub, bank statement, telephone bill, and checkbook to apply for a payday loan, and also showing that 
payday lenders advertise that consumers can obtain loans in minutes, without hassles or credit checks). 
 226 See M. Ray Perryman, The High Costs of Payday Loans, PERRYMAN GRP. (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.perrymangroup.com/publications/column/2015/12/21/the-high-costs-of-payday-loans/ 
[https://perma.cc/R7LF-J846] (stating that many borrowers are attracted to payday loans because of their 
ease of access); PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 220, at 4 (reporting that more than three in four 
borrowers find payday loans appealing because they trust the lenders’ description of the product and need 
a quick cash infusion). 
 227 See Morse, supra note 192, at 42 (noting lower foreclosures following natural disasters); DONALD 
P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY 
CREDIT BANS 26 (2008), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/ 
sr309.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PGW-USU8] (highlighting lower rates of bounced checks); Jonathan 
Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon 
Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 553 (2010) (describing improved subjective assessment of financial 
well-being); Neil Bhutta, Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan 
Bans, 59 J.L. & ECON. 225, 256 (2016) (arguing that payday loans reduce incidences of involuntary bank-
account closures). 
 228 See, e.g., Neil Bhutta, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loan Choices and 
Consequences, 47 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 223, 223 (2015) (arguing that payday loans have little 
to no long-term effect on consumers’ credit scores); Hawkins, supra note 192, at 1394–99 (discussing 
tenuous link to financial distress due to limited principal amounts of debt). 
 229 See infra Section III.B.2. 
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1. Similar Flaws 
a. High costs 
In comparison to mainstream credit options, such as credit cards and 
unsecured personal loans, which have APRs between 15% and 35%, payday 
loans are extremely expensive.230 The median payday loan fee of $15 per 
$100 borrowed translates into an APR of 391% on a two-week loan.231 Some 
borrowers report paying fees exceeding an APR of 1000%.232 As put by one 
scholar, “[t]he U.S. market is missing several rungs in the lending ladder” 
between mainstream credit services and payday loans.233 This wide gulf is 
often explained as an inevitable consequence of high default risk and high 
fixed costs notwithstanding the small sums of each of transaction.234 Some 
observers, however, suggest the high fees are likely anticompetitive as 
evidenced by the fact that pricing does not adjust based on changes in supply 
or demand.235 Payday lenders tend to charge the highest permissible rate 
established by applicable state law irrespective of market conditions.236 In 
states that have no interest-rate caps, payday loans are the most expensive.237 
A close look at earned-wage programs reveals they are similarly priced. 
Ironically, the purportedly free service Earnin most readily demonstrates this 
similarity. Earnin has encouraged its users to pay a $9 tip for a one-week 
loan of $100,238 which would amount to an APR of 469%. Not only is this 
rate comparable to payday-loan fees, but this rate is illegal in Washington, 
D.C. and fifteen of the states where Earnin currently operates.239 Though 
users can technically opt out of leaving a tip, the voluntariness of such fees 
is questionable. In most other transactions, tips do not affect the range of 
 
 230 See Bill Fay, Payday Lenders and Loans, DEBT (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.debt.org/credit/payday-lenders/ [https://perma.cc/WJZ7-Z7N3] (comparing payday loans’ 
300%–500% APR with 15%–30% APR on credit cards and a 10%–25% rate for a personal loan from a 
bank or credit union). 
 231 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 232 See Alain Sherter, 1,000% Loans? Millions of Borrowers Face Crushing Costs, CBS NEWS (Apr. 
25, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1000-loans-millions-of-borrowers-face-crushing-costs/ 
[https://perma.cc/T446-MEXX] (reporting incidents of payday loans that carry an APR of more than 
1,000%). 
 233 Jonathan Zinman, Consumer Credit: Too Much or Too Little (or Just Right)?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S209, S212 (2014). 
 234 Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 864–65 (2007). 
 235 Id. at 883. 
 236 Id. at 882. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Dugan, supra note 90. 
 239 See Farivar, supra note 32 (“Payday lending is illegal in 15 states and Washington, D.C., but 
Earnin operates nationwide.”). 
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services available to customers. For example, being a bad tipper at a 
restaurant does not mean you cannot order a steak during your next visit. 
Yet, being a poor tipper as an Earnin customer has been found to limit the 
amount of transferable funds and access to other services otherwise available 
to the user. An Earnin user reported that he experienced a near-30% decrease 
in available funds in a single pay period following a week in which he 
declined to pay a tip.240 Earnin reportedly changed its algorithm for New 
York customers in anticipation of an investigation by the New York 
Department of Financial Services, but the change was not representative of 
its nationwide business model.241 
Earnin is not the only high-cost earned-wage program. The average 
DailyPay user transfers approximately $66 1.5 times per week at a per-
transaction fee of $1.99 or $2.99 (depending on the speed of transfer).242 Such 
fees can in some instances amount to an APR between 221% and 330%.243 
In comparison, providers like PayActiv and Even are relatively inexpensive, 
though still above some state usury limits. PayActiv’s unsubsidized fees for 
a biweekly pay period may amount to an APR of about 197%, and employer 
subsidies could make the service even cheaper or free.244 PayActiv reports 
that over 50% of its users enjoy programs that are subsidized in full or in part 
by employers, although a more fulsome breakdown has not been publicly 
disclosed.245 The Even app, which uses a subscription-based fee model, 
would more impressively lead to average costs of about 73% APR for its 
 
 240 Complaint, supra note 43, at 23 (claiming available limit was once decreased from $350 to $250 
following the user’s failure to tip). 
 241 Dugan, supra note 88 (“Earnin did away with the pay-to-play feature—which handed out as much 
as 10 times more in loans to users who voluntarily tipped, according to internal documents and a source 
close to the company—around the time of a March 28 subpoena from the New York Department of 
Financial Services, according to sources.”). 
 242 Dailypay for ADP Workforce FAQs, supra note 109 (listing a $1.99 fee for next-day ACH 
payment and a $2.99 fee for next-day instant payment). 
 243 APR is (i) the finance charge divided by loan amount, (ii) multiplied by 365, (iii) divided by the 
number of days to repayment, and (iv) multiplied by 100. These calculations assume a biweekly pay 
period with a transfer made five days prior to payday. This reasonably contemplates the 1.5-times-per-
week transfers reported by DailyPay. See id. 
 244 This calculation assumes a biweekly pay period (which compelled a $5-per-pay-period fee under 
PayActiv’s 2019 pricing model) with a transfer of $132 (to mirror DailyPay average usage) made seven 
days prior to payday. PayActiv’s fee structures have, however, evolved significantly in recent months and 
now include free offerings that instead rely on interchange fees if consumers use a PayActiv-issued pay 
card. See PARRISH, supra note 34, at 11, 14 (“PayActiv charge[s] no fees to the employer or employee 
for EWA deposits to the provider’s card—instead relying on interchange fee income generated from the 
digital wallet into which EWAs are loaded.”). 
 245 HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30.  
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average advance.246 However, the Even subscription charge raises a unique 
concern in months when no transfers are made: what is the APR for a $6–$8 
fee on a $0 advance?247 
On the one hand, some earned-wage programs show promise to fill in 
the pricing gaps that currently exist in the consumer-lending market.248 On 
the other hand, some programs easily rival or exceed the costs of payday 
loans notwithstanding potential market efficiencies, especially if users make 
routine use of the transfers. 
b. Limited underwriting 
Unlike most mainstream credit services, payday lenders do not assess a 
borrower’s ability to repay a loan by maturity. Lenders review recent pay 
stubs to set borrowing amounts, but they do not confirm that future wages 
will be similar through employment verifications.249 Lenders also do not 
confirm whether borrowers will be able to repay the loan by maturity and 
continue to meet their existing obligations. Such loans are based on the total 
amount of likely earnings rather than disposable income. Thus, the single 
balloon repayment at the end of the loan term often demands more of the 
borrower’s funds than is sustainable.250 Studies suggest that borrowers are 
reasonably able to contribute up to 5% of their take-home pay to service 
payday loans,251 but payday-loan repayment schedules often demand more 
 
 246 This calculation assumes a bimonthly pay period and $150 transfers on Day 5 and Day 25 with a 
payday following five days after each transfer date. Because the $6 fee is for all transfers in the month, 
the first transfer is effectively amortized—$150 is ultimately repaid in twenty days at a $6 charge. See 
Kauflin, supra note 8 (reporting that users take out $150 on average and pay $6 to $8 a month for access). 
 247 Notably, Even mitigates this concern by automatically unsubscribing users after two months of 
no transfer activity. See Reyes, supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 248 In doing so, earned-wage programs may also raise doubts as to prevailing notions of fairness with 
respect to fees for short-term liquidity solutions. Since the lower fees remain above say an APR of 36%—
even with employer intermediation and subsidies, effective amortization through periodic fees, and lower 
default risks and transaction costs—the market might be revealing the true costs that private solutions can 
bear. 
 249 See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 1041.5(c)(2) 
(2020); see also Pete Isberg, Early Access to Earned Wages vs. Payday Lending, BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 
26, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/payroll/early-access-to-earned-wages-vs-payday-
lending [https://perma.cc/8X6X-DCHM] (“Some firms merely rely on consumer confirmation or 
evidence of employment, such as a recent pay stub, instead of direct verification of available earnings 
through the employer’s payroll system.”). 
 250 See Atkinson, supra note 196, at 1147–52 (discussing the pitfalls of credit as a solution to the 
financial challenges low-income Americans face). 
 251 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: POLICY SOLUTIONS 3 (2013), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/pewpaydayoverviewandrecom 
mendationspdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ2C-YWSF]. 
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than 36% of the same.252 Consequently, most borrowers are left with an 
impossible choice between timely repayment of payday loans and 
maintaining household expenses.253 
More than 80% of borrowers instead extend via “rollover” or refinance 
their payday loans,254 choosing to pay additional fees until they have saved 
enough to make the repayment in full. The average payday borrower makes 
rollovers or refinances ten to twelve times annually,255 and the average $325 
loan generates interest and fees totaling $520.256 Even borrowers who 
ultimately default will service five payday loans before doing so, having 
made interest payments equal to 90% of their original loan principal.257 
In comparison, earned-wage programs offer slight improvements on 
payday underwriting but suffer from a similar flaw that can result in 
unanticipated costs for consumers. On the one hand, earned-wage programs 
utilize advanced employment-verification tools to set transferable amounts 
based on more precise estimates of future wages.258 Payday lenders issue 
loans based on an assumption that the past pay stub is representative of future 
work hours and pay rates—an assumption which can easily be upended if the 
user suffers a reduction in work hours, a demotion, or job loss. In contrast, 
earned-wage programs authorize transfers constrained by real-time 
 
 252 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LOAN FACTS AND THE CFPB’S IMPACT 1 (2016), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and-the-cfp 
bs-impact [https://perma.cc/3SUX-MR2R] (reporting that the average payday loan consumes 36% of an 
average borrower’s gross paycheck). 
 253 See Lisa Blaylock Moss, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the 
Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1742 (2000) (“The high rates alone contribute to 
unmanageable levels of personal indebtedness among low and modest income households, sending many 
desperate consumers into a downward spiral of indebtedness which ultimately forces them into 
bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)); CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE 
FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 14 (2004) (“[Payday loans are] a trap [some debtors] cannot escape 
without missing rent, utilities, car payments, or food expenditures. These loans can create a biweekly 
cycle of income and expenses leaving only enough surplus income to pay the most recent accrual in 
interest and fees.”). 
 254 KATHLEEN BURKE, JONATHAN LANNING, JESSE LEARY & JIALAN WANG, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, OFF. OF RSCH., CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING 4 (2014), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKE6-
RMLD]. 
 255 Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous 
Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 217 (2007). 
 256 Adam Tempkin & Christopher Maloney, Expensive Loans to Desperate People Built this $90 
Billion Industry, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019, 7:17 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2019-02-14/expensive-loans-to-desperate-people-built-this-90-billion-industry [https://perma.cc/F7YY-
QU5Q] (quoting a senior research officer with the Pew Charitable Trust’s consumer-finance project).  
 257 Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 208, at 1. 
 258 See supra Section I.A.  
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employment data evidencing actual hours worked and rate of pay.259 Thus, 
earned-wage programs do a better job than payday loans at limiting a 
consumer’s risk of unmanageable loss.260 On the other hand, earned-wage 
programs similarly fall short of determining whether users can support full 
repayment and their existing obligations. Neither the transferrable amounts 
set by earned-wage programs nor reimbursements are limited to the user’s 
disposable income. Affordability can thus only be presumed if users have 
zero other expenses. In reality, full reimbursement can easily exceed 25% to 
50% of payday earnings, which can severely inhibit a user’s ability to pay 
existing obligations.261 
Accordingly, it is likely that users of earned-wage programs will 
repeatedly use these programs, just as payday borrowers do with payday 
loans. Already, some users have been compelled to make back-to-back 
transfers because they are unable to “catch up” the cash-flow shortfall in one 
pay cycle.262 To the extent fees are incurred on a per-transaction basis, the 
fees will have compounding effects similar to payday loans.263 Yet, as with 
payday loans, first-time users may not fully appreciate the likelihood of these 
compounding costs. To the extent fees are instead incurred on a periodic 
basis, like a subscription fee, the compounding effect is somewhat 
ameliorated since multiple transfers can be made under one fee like a line of 
credit. In each instance, however, the impact will be a relatively substantial 
drain on the already-limited resources of low-income borrowers. 
c. Credit invisibility 
Lastly, the effects of the high costs and limited underwriting attendant 
to payday loans are exacerbated by the fact that payday borrowers are in a 
perpetually weak bargaining position and lack access to low-cost 
alternatives. Most borrowers lack meaningful access to mainstream credit 
 
 259 See supra Section I.A. 
 260 Cf. Hawkins, supra note 192, at 1394 (explaining that payday lending is often capped at the 
employee’s biweekly salary).  
 261 See Dailypay for ADP Workforce FAQs, supra note 109 (“Employees on average will receive 
51.9% of their paycheck on payday.”). 
 262 See Dugan, supra note 90; Sidney Fussell, The New Payday Lender Looks a Lot Like the Old 
Payday Lender, ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/12/ 
online-banking-lending-earnin-tip/603304/ [https://perma.cc/5SSX-Y2Y3]. 
 263 Cf. Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages 
Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 8–9 (2003) (noting that state legislatures allow payday lenders 
to charge fees that reach high amounts when compounded).  
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services because they are already highly credit constrained264 and tend to 
have poor credit265 or insufficient credit histories.266 With limited incomes 
that barely cover expenses, their dire financial circumstances often demand 
expediency and simplicity in liquidity solutions, both of which are lacking 
in mainstream services.267 Thus, payday lenders are their best, and often only, 
option.268 With such disproportionate bargaining power, payday lenders are 
not compelled to reduce costs or otherwise improve their service offerings.269 
They are also not compelled to assist borrowers in accessing superior 
alternatives. Such access would follow if payday lenders reported positive 
repayment history to credit bureaus,270 but they do not. As put by one scholar: 
A good credit record is like a coupon that borrowers can take to the 
(conventional) bank to get a discount on their loan purchases. Fringe borrowers 
with poor repayment histories are not directly nor immediately hurt by credit 
reporting. They simply are not offered the coupon, and therefore they have to 
keep paying the same high prices for their loan purchases.271 
 
 264 Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 169, 173 (2007) (“[R]elative to all 
U.S. adults, three times the percentage of payday loan customers are seriously debt burdened and have 
been denied credit or not given as much credit as they applied for in the last five years.”). 
 265 See Bhutta et al., supra note 228, at 233–34 (noting that payday-loan borrowers had average and 
median credit scores below 520 versus the general population’s 680 and 703, respectively, and that 
borrowers failed to secure credit from over five attempts in the twelve-month period prior to taking out a 
payday loan); GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMERS’ USE OF PAYDAY LOANS 33 
tbl.IV-8 (2009) (finding that 55% of payday borrowers had a credit request denied or limited in the 
preceding five-year period and nearly 60% chose payday loans over applying for traditional credit 
because they believed they would be denied for the latter). 
 266 Nearly 45% of individuals in low-income communities (with a disproportionate number being 
Black or Hispanic) lack sufficient credit records to access relatively cheap credit from traditional financial 
institutions. Kenneth P. Brevoort, Philipp Grimm & Michelle Kambara, Credit Invisibles and the 
Unscored, 18 CITYSCAPE 9, 18–19 exhibit 5 (2016). 
 267 See Stegman & Faris, supra note 263, at 13 (explaining that research of California payday 
borrowers found they preferred payday lenders to mainstream financial institutions because the former 
provide easier access to cash; transparent fees; accessible locations; better treatment of customers; greater 
trustworthiness; and better service because of the many useful products in one location, better hours, and 
more Spanish-speaking employees). 
 268 See Gregory Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use of High-Price Credit Products: Do They Know What 
They Are Doing? 34 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Indiana State Univ., Working Paper No. 2, 2006) (“The 
decision to use high-price credit typically is a result of the consumer’s situation rather than a lack of 
knowledge or information.”). 
 269 See THE YEARBOOK OF CONSUMER LAW 2009, at 162 (Deborah Parry, Annette Nordhausen, 
Geraint Howells & Christian Twigg-Flesner eds., 2008) (discussing a lack of incentive to compete for 
reasonable rates due to consumers’ unequal bargaining power). 
 270 Brevoort et al., supra note 266, at 9 (“Lenders use [credit bureaus’] records pervasively to assess 
creditworthiness when underwriting or pricing credit.”). 
 271 Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 1013 (2006). 
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Likewise, earned-wage programs do not report reimbursement history 
to credit bureaus, which might be expected since these programs purport to 
be money-transmission services. It follows, then, that there is no debt 
obligation being repaid. Earned-wage programs are instead services in the 
cash economy, or at least that is how they are marketed. The reality, however, 
is that the function of an earned-wage provider funding transfers and later 
being reimbursed by the user is the quintessential function of any lender.272 
Additionally, there is a slim risk of nonpayment such as by withdrawing 
funds from accounts prior to scheduled preauthorized debits, terminating 
employment, or, even more rare, revoking a payroll-deduction 
authorization.273 Though low nonpayment risks are customarily tracked for 
mainstream credit services, low-income users are unable to build credit via 
liquidity solutions specifically tailored for them. As in the context of payday 
lending, earned-wage providers operate to keep low-income users on the 
fringes of the financial markets instead of fulfilling their promise of creating 
a more equitable financial system.274 
2. Similar Risks 
The similar flaws shared by payday loans and earned-wage programs—
high costs, limited underwriting, and credit invisibility—extend beyond 
being expensive and suboptimal in comparison to mainstream services. 
There is substantial evidence that these features worsen the health and 
financial conditions of many payday borrowers.275 In the payday-loan 
context, high costs and limited underwriting work together to inhibit 
borrowers’ ability to pay important bills.276 Specifically, access to payday 
loans has been shown to increase household difficulties with paying 
mortgage, rent, and utility bills.277 Payday borrowers are also more likely to 
 
 272 See supra Section III.A. 
 273 See Hawkins, supra note 54, at 40–41. 
 274 See, e.g., Our Story, supra note 56 (describing early-wage provider’s “mission of evening the 
playing field for creating a better life”). 
 275 See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market, 
126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011) (“[Payday] loan access increases households’ difficulty in paying 
mortgage, rent and utilities bills . . . . [and] increase[s] the likelihood of delaying needed medical care, 
dental care and prescription drug purchases.”); Jaeyoon Lee, Credit Access and Household Well-Being: 
Evidence from Payday Lending 3 (Mar. 7, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2915197 [https://perma.cc/KH92-XAB3] (finding that access to payday loans 
increases suicide attempts by 10%). 
 276 Melzer, supra note 275, at 550. 
 277 Id. But see Morse, supra note 192, at 42 (finding that access to payday loans mitigates the 
likelihood of home foreclosures and larcenies after natural disasters). 
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close their bank accounts due to bounced checks.278 Other studies have found 
that payday borrowers are associated with higher personal bankruptcy rates 
than similarly situated nonpayday borrowers.279 Because the average person 
who files for bankruptcy is just $26 per month short of meeting their 
expenses,280 the compounded costs of repeat payday loans might be the 
difference between solvency and bankruptcy for some borrowers. 
Ultimately, payday loans can increase stress over financial circumstances 
and decrease job performance.281 Indeed, the U.S. military observed that 
payday lending decreased morale and readiness among troops,282 and in 
response, Congress enacted a federal payday-loan ban to protect 
servicemembers.283 It is likely that the high costs and limited underwriting 
associated with payday loans have the same effect on civilian workers 
though no similar federal ban exists to protect them.284 
 
 278 Dennis Campbell, F. Asís Martínez Jerez & Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out of the Banking System: 
An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures 6 (Dec. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/a=1335873 [https://perma.cc/8ENN-DFW6] (finding that the presence of payday 
lending is positively associated with bank-account closures). But see Bhutta et al., supra note 227, at 227 
(finding that payday-loan bans resulted in increased incidences of involuntary bank-account closures). 
 279 See Robert Mayer, Payday Lending and Personal Bankruptcy, 50 CONSUMER INTS. ANN. 76, 76–
78 (2004) (finding that payday-loan debtors in Illinois, New Mexico, and Wisconsin declare bankruptcy 
more quickly than nonpayday-loan borrowers); see also Donald P. Morgan, Michael R. Strain & Ihab 
Seblani, How Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other Outcomes, 44 J. MONEY CREDIT & 
BANKING 519, 524–26 (2012) (finding that Chapter 13 bankruptcy rates decreased after payday-loan bans 
were enacted while complaints against lenders and debt collectors increased); Paige Marta Skiba & 
Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 21 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=1266215 [https://perma.cc/5RMW-8R3C] 
(finding higher bankruptcy rates among individuals who took out payday loans); Noyes, supra note 222, 
at 1645 (“Wisconsin consumer bankruptcy filings establish that bankruptcy petitioners with payday loans 
go bankrupt sooner than other debtors . . . .”). But see ROBERT SHAPIRO, SONECON, THE CONSUMER AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PAYDAY LOANS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 12 (2011), 
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Report-Payday-Loans-Shapiro-Sonecon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88P7-EZWB] (finding higher rates of bankruptcy after payday bans enacted than when 
permissive laws enacted); Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State 
Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 391 (2009) (finding that the existence of payday 
loans has no effect on bankruptcy rates). 
 280 Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 167 (2014). 
 281 Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel 
Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805, 2808–09 (2014). 
 282 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF 
THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 35–36, 45, 86–87 (2006). 
 283 See Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2018) (codifying that “[a] creditor . . . may not 
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit 
extended to [armed forces personnel or their dependents]” and effectively banning the payday-loan 
business model). 
 284 See Johnson, supra note 51, at 666–69.  
115:1505 (2021) The Rise of “FringeTech” 
1553 
Moreover, by not reporting positive repayment history to credit 
bureaus, payday lenders keep payday borrowers on the lowest rungs of the 
lending ladder. Such failure to report payment history also has detrimental 
effects on other aspects of payday borrowers’ lives. Credit reports are used 
for a host of other services, including to price auto and homeowners’ 
insurance premiums, establish utility accounts, rent housing and set deposit 
rates, and obtain employment benefits.285 Creditworthy payday borrowers 
lose out not only on improved access to affordable credit services but also 
access to more affordable goods and services and favorable employment 
decisions. 
Although extensive studies have yet to be conducted on earned-wage 
programs, the documented effects of payday loans likely foreshadow the 
effects of earned-wage programs because the two products share similar 
features in function, if not in form. The HKS 2018 Study challenges this 
position, suggesting that earned-wage programs are beneficial because of 
lower relative costs for users and improved retention for their employers.286 
However, the study was severely limited in three ways. First, its dataset was 
limited to users of PayActiv, an earned-wage program with a periodic fee 
structure that has many employer partners that subsidize costs.287 The study 
did not consider the effect of all fee structures available to earned-wage 
programs, many of which can result in significantly higher costs than 
PayActiv. Earned-wage programs are not created equally and should not be 
painted with a broad brush.288 Second, even with respect to PayActiv, the 
limited price simulation compared an earned-wage transfer to a two-week 
payday loan and a standard bank-overdraft transaction.289 The respective 
costs were not discussed in terms of APR,290 which would better reflect the 
comparative costs of a PayActiv transfer made just days before payday. 
Third, the study did not directly consider the effect of long-term use on users; 
rather, it determined long-term use resulted in reduced turnover rates for 
 
 285 Brevoort et al., supra note 266, at 9. 
 286 See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (finding that PayActiv service fees were only 16.7% of 
payday-loan fees and 14.3% of bank-overdraft fees). 
 287 See id. The other service the study examined was a “short-term installment loan” service, not an 
earned-wage program. Id. For examples of PayActiv’s employer partners, see Improve Employee 
Financial Wellness, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/employers/ [https://perma.cc/52UG-6NV5]. 
 288 See, e.g., supra Sections I.A, III.B.1.a (surveying the types and varying interest rates of earned-
wage programs). 
 289 See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30. 
 290 Id. (comparing respective costs in dollars, not APR). 
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employers.291 The effect on employees remains an open question—one on 
which the payday-loan market likely proves instructive. 
C. Unique Market Risks 
1. Inflated Pricing 
While earned-wage programs share many of the same risks as payday 
loans, they also pose risks unique to their transactions. For example, the 
market for earned-wage programs has a heightened risk of inflated pricing 
due to programs’ disparate fee structures. It is well documented that price 
competition is inhibited when pricing disclosure is not uniform across 
substitute services.292 This is because a mismatch in pricing units results in 
the majority of Americans being unable to discern the most cost-efficient 
options, thereby allowing providers to impose inflated pricing.293 And loan 
markets with ineffective price disclosures are associated with a 2% to 4% 
increase in loan costs compared to markets with effective price disclosures.294 
The market for earned-wage programs is riddled with a variety of 
pricing models.295 There are programs with per-transaction fees, per-pay-
period fees, monthly fees, and even voluntary tip structures.296 None of these 
models disclose prices in a manner that enables effective price comparison 
across competing programs. The lack of uniform disclosure also inhibits 
price comparison across would-be substitutes, such as payday loans, 
 
 291 The study merely speculated that employees using PayActiv may “be able to take steps over time 
to improve their credit profile and rejoin the traditional financial system,” but it concluded “that active 
use of the PayActiv product by an employee is associated with a materially lower turnover rate.” Id.  
 292 See Sovern, supra note 147, at 1663–64. 
 293 Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: 
Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REGUL. 181, 210 (2008) (noting that only 13% 
of adults have sufficient quantitative skills to compare the relative costs of competing services when 
computation is necessary). 
 294 See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, How a Cognitive Bias Shapes Competition: Evidence 
from Consumer Credit Markets 2–4 (Sept. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs. 
semanticscholar.org/20d9/a6464fe71466fa4d149a5237079bd9fe8fae.pdf [https://perma.cc/68US-7Z2T] 
(finding that “rates are 200-400 basis points higher” for loans obtained from nonbank sources). One 
percentage point is equal to 100 basis points. See Simon Constable, What Is a Basis Point and Why Is It 
So Important?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2013, 4:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324823804579017141254359828 [https://perma.cc/5NEN-TQWW]. 
 295 See Mark J. Ricciardi, Is Payday the New Groundhog Day? What Bill Murray Can Teach 
Employers About New Pay Apps, FISHER PHILLIPS (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/pp/ 
newsletterarticle-is-payday-the-new-groundhog-day-what.pdf?28082 [https://perma.cc/EA7V-H348] 
(discussing differences in fee structures); Chris Opfer, ‘Early Wage’ Apps Aim to Disrupt Payday Loans, 
Two-Week Cycle, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 1, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/early-wage-apps-aim-to-disrupt-payday-loans-two-week-cycle [https://perma.cc/6YSL-M4T3] 
(discussing high pricing). 
 296 See supra Section I.A. 
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overdraft protection, or pawn-shop services.297 Consequently, the earned-
wage market likely suffers from inflated pricing because users are unable to 
discern the most cost-efficient options and may inadvertently select more 
expensive services. Some earned-wage users have already demonstrated the 
danger of such opacity in pricing. On a service that purports to be free, users 
voluntarily pay tips in amounts equivalent to payday-loan rates.298 Such 
behavior is difficult to reconcile with anything other than an 
underappreciation of the similarity in costs. This is particularly problematic 
in the context of earned-wage programs since low-income users are already 
cash-strapped. Consequently, inflated pricing can be the difference between 
solvency and bankruptcy.299 
2. The Employer Effect 
The presence of employers as gatekeepers in the context of earned-
wage programs could mitigate some of the foregoing concerns, but at what 
alternative costs? Employers may be more objective and better positioned 
than individual earned-wage users to negotiate optimal service terms. But 
with the “salary link,” where employers automate repayment to earned-wage 
programs via payroll deductions,300 employers also deprive their employees 
of the autonomy to efficiently manage their own finances. 
a. Benefit: employer-gatekeepers 
Employer-sponsored programs promise to provide the small-sum 
liquidity market with a rare demand-side gatekeeper: employers. Employers 
may negotiate better terms than individual consumers because they are likely 
more sophisticated shoppers and can wield the aggregate demand of their 
employees in negotiations.301 Employers likely have the time and resources 
to price shop more effectively than cash-strapped employees with limited 
quantitative skills and impending repayment obligations. Employers are also 
 
 297 This Article conducts a comparative analysis between earned-wage programs and payday loans 
because these two programs explicitly tie advances to wages and are otherwise unsecured, as well as 
because providers in the earned-wage market explicitly sought to disrupt the payday lending market. 
However, open questions remain as to how earned-wage programs fare in the broader market for single-
repayment liquidity solutions, which include overdraft protection and pawn services.  
 298 Farivar, supra note 32. 
 299 See Section II.A. 
 300 See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30. 
 301 Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 881 n.57 (2013) 
(discussing a policy that shifted retirement investment risks to workers as odd because the employer 
“presumably was a more sophisticated investor (or had access to sophisticated investment advice) and 
could secure economies of scale in managing that risk,” while workers “could be expected neither to be 
sophisticated themselves nor to have access to the same quality of advice as would the employer”).  
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well positioned to negotiate ex ante service terms—e.g., transfer limits, 
repayment dates, and collection practices—that contribute to ex post 
consumer harms. In sum, with proper incentives, employer-gatekeepers may 
be able to protect vulnerable consumers from selecting unduly expensive or 
risky earned-wage products. 
b. Drawback: inefficient contracting 
Despite the potential benefits of employers as gatekeepers, recall that 
some employer-sponsored programs are reimbursed directly by the user’s 
employer via a payroll deduction before wages are disbursed to the user. This 
salary link enables earned-wage programs to offer near-risk-free advances, 
which in turn allows for prices that can be lower than other short-term 
liquidity solutions.302 The salary link effectively makes the earned-wage 
transfer a nondefaultable debt, in that providers will get paid so long as the 
borrower remains with the same employer.303 This payroll-deduction feature, 
however, runs afoul of several principles of contract and wage-assignment 
law that promote the efficient allocation of user resources. 
Specifically, the salary link effectively collateralizes an earned-wage 
user’s employment as well as a user’s interest in future employment, the 
value of which is typically eight to nine times more than the principal amount 
of the advance.304 Earned-wage users are thereby bound by the inflexible 
pricing and repayment terms and would be, for example, unable to defer a 
balloon repayment, even if only by a few days, to avoid a home-mortgage 
default or to maintain utility services. Where payroll deductions are 
irrevocable, either explicitly305 or in practice,306 a program user’s options for 
resolving a cash shortfall are to request another transfer (possibly for a fee) 
or to seek costly external credit solutions. Consequently, the findings of 
reduced employee turnover under the HKS 2018 Study could be telling a 
different story.307 Users may feel beholden to a job that never quite pays 
 
 302 Todd H. Baker & Snigdha Kumar, A Better Alternative to Payday Loans, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 
2018, 1:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-better-alternative-to-payday-loans-1526233530 
[https://perma.cc/54Q9-YJY9] (discussing how salary link allows for “markedly superior loan 
performance, with default rates running at less than 20% the rate predicted by [traditional] scoring”).  
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. (explaining how earned-wage users “who would otherwise default decide against leaving a 
job”). 
 305 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 306 See Hawkins, supra note 54, at 22–23 (noting that for one program, users may not be aware of 
the right to rescind, which was supported by the fact that in the entire history of the business no user opted 
out of the payroll deduction). 
 307 Additionally, this preliminary study analyzed the price and effect of two FinTech services: 
SalaryFinance, an employer-based installment loan service, and PayActiv, a prominent earned-wage 
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enough as they endeavor to “catch up” to the reimbursement. The United 
States has seen this risk realized in its extreme form in the context of the 
company store.308 Indeed, the Supreme Court noted nearly a century ago, 
“From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not 
earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the 
necessary result of either.”309 Anti-wage-assignment laws aim to prevent 
such a result,310 but earned-wage programs subvert these laws. Ultimately, 
the exacting terms of some employer-sponsored programs inhibit the 
efficient allocation of user resources by inhibiting employees from switching 
jobs when it best suits them or using their earnings to first pay obligations 
with greater economic benefit, such as a mortgage or utility services.311 
Thus, on the one hand, by adding employers as gatekeepers, employer-
sponsored programs promise to improve the bargaining positions of 
consumers toward their creditors. On the other hand, many of these programs 
create a nearly-risk-free business model for earned-wage providers while 
posing many risks to users. Such programs intertwine user choices regarding 
employment and financial obligations in a manner that leaves users caught 
between Scylla and Charybdis.312 The adverse effects on users are likely to 
 
provider that utilizes the employer-sponsor model with a pay-period fee structure. HKS 2018 Study, supra 
note 30. In relevant part, the study found that a $200 PayActiv transfer was approximately 85% cheaper 
for users than an equivalent two-week payday loan or bank overdraft. Id. It also analyzed the effect of 
long-term use of PayActiv, finding that employees who made two or more transfers had a 19% lower 
turnover rate than employees who enrolled in PayActiv but failed to use it as much. Id. However, the 
study’s pricing analysis is representative neither of the varied price structures in the earned-wage market 
nor of the PayActiv user who takes out $200 just days before payday (rather than two weeks before). 
Also, while the benefit of long-term use that can accrue to employers is an important contribution, the 
study’s failure to assess the long-term economic effect on employees leaves open a critical question. 
 308 See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 796–97 (“Debts to the company stores fastened workers to the mines and 
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and other provisions they supplied.”); see also Note, Payment of Advance Wages in Trade Checks on 
Company Store, 40 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106 (1931) (describing employer effort to subvert regulations 
intended to nullify exploitative company-store transactions by instead offering wage advances, which 
operated as credit services but did not fall within the meaning of the regulatory restrictions). 
 309 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). 
 310 Under federal law, wage assignments must be revocable, a preauthorized payroll deduction, or 
already-earned wages. See Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2014). However, state law is more 
restrictive. Some states explicitly ban wage assignments except for employer advances. See, e.g., N.Y. 
LAB. LAW § 195-5.2 (2020). Other states require notice and/or grace periods before deductions, cap 
deduction amounts, and/or require that assignments be revocable. See, e.g., Illinois Wage Assignment 
Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170 (2020). 
 311 See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).  
 312 In Greek mythology, Scylla and Charybdis were mythical sea monsters that were stationed on 
opposite sides of the Strait of Messina. Each sea monster was a maritime hazard to passing sailors, as 
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be compounded if, in reliance on their employers’ intermediation, users fail 
to effectively explore more competitive third-party liquidity solutions. 
D. Warning Signs 
The above demonstrates that the answer to the opening question of this 
Article is a disconcerting one. Recall Jack, who used an employer-sponsored 
program with a monthly subscription fee subsidized by Walmart, and Jill, 
who used a third-party program with per-transaction tips. The foregoing 
analysis suggests that Jack is better off than Jill, who may be saddled with 
snowballing expenses characteristic of existing credit products; but for Jack, 
the benefit of his subsidized program costs him his already-limited 
bargaining power. Their predicaments demonstrate how the average 
consumer is not necessarily better off with earned-wage programs. 
The earned-wage market’s biggest proponent is time because arguably 
not enough time has passed to evidence the above scenarios. However, like 
a canary in a coal mine, some early adopters have signaled the widespread 
financial harms that could result from this marketplace. Two class action 
lawsuits were filed in federal court in California against Earnin, a third-party 
program provider. In the first case, the plaintiffs asserted that the exacting 
repayment terms of the program result in burdensome overdraft fees, 
notwithstanding the program’s insight into their insufficient bank account 
balances.313 They alleged Earnin violated state law by failing to disclose its 
repayment practices and the likelihood of bank overdraft charges.314 In the 
second case, the named plaintiff asserted that he initially used the program 
to overcome a financial rough patch, but “his initial use of Earnin began a 
regular pattern of use” and “a cycle of advances that he has found difficult 
to escape.”315 He also claimed he was unaware of the true cost of the “tips” 
he paid to the program.316 He alleged Earnin violated various state laws and 
the TILA by, inter alia, lending without a proper state license, engaging in 
usurious lending, and failing to disclose the APR and the true “loan” nature 
of its product to customers.317 
 
avoiding one meant passing too closely to the other and the risks posed by it. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 
278–85 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996). The phrase “between Scylla and Charybdis” has come to be an idiom 
meaning “having to choose between two evils.” 
 313 Complaint at 2, Perks v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-05543 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019).  
 314 Id. at 3. 
 315 Complaint, supra note 43, at 22. 
 316 Id. at 23. 
 317 See id. at 24, 27–28.  
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A scan of hundreds of consumer reports suggests these plaintiffs are not 
alone. Several consumers report having insufficient funds when repayment 
was due, thus resulting in excessive overdraft charges.318 Other reports reflect 
dependency on the transfers such that a decrease in the available transfer 
amount was perceived as withholding their earnings or the customer 
otherwise losing money.319 One user, ironically a debt collector familiar with 
payday lending, viewed the earned-wage program as distinct from payday 
loans and a harmless way to take out money. However, he found himself 
regularly paying tips that amounted to an APR of 469%, in a $350 deficit 
due to overdraft fees, and “dependent on [the program] to get [his] money 
out before payday.”320 
Multiple states are investigating the earned-wage market for possible 
violations of state lending laws.321 Yet, these regulatory interventions are 
moving, as they often do, slowly. And though the California lawsuits offered 
an opportunity for legal clarity, their settlement indefinitely delayed answers 
that would resolve the underlying uncertainty.322 In the interim, due to 
shortcomings in existing money-transmitter laws, a growing number of 
consumers are vulnerable to these outcomes as they rush to download third-
party apps and their employers push such services as new employee benefits. 
However, alternatively applying lending laws may leave customers 
vulnerable to some risks unique to the earned-wage market and may unduly 
stifle the market’s expansion even after given the proper guardrails. 
 
 318 While in some instances the repayment was prematurely withdrawn by Earnin, in many cases it 
appears the consumer lacked sufficient funds when repayment was due. See Complaints: Earnin, BETTER 
BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/us/ca/palo-alto/profile/mobile-apps/earnin-1216-642613/ 
complaints [https://perma.cc/6VRC-FL4G]. 
 319 See id. One consumer noted: “My max was lowered this week again now to [$]200 . . . . [I]f I am 
giving you 250 dollars and only being able to get [$]200 back[,] I’m losing money . . . .” Id. Another 
consumer complained: “They abuse their consumers financially. They amp up the amount you can 
[withdraw] and then on the next payday they reduce it greatly. I have been credited with [$]175 and on 
my next payday [it] will be reduced . . . to [$]100.” Id.  
 320 Dugan, supra note 90. 
 321 Stephen T. Middlebrook & Tom Kierner, What Employers Need to Know About Advance Wage 
Payment Products, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-
employers-need-to-know-about-advance-wage-payment-products [https://perma.cc/7NB9-KKR9]. 
 322 See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement & for 
Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, & Service Awards, Perks v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-05543-
BLF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021); see also Emilie Ruscoe, Earnin Users Seek OK for $12.5M Settlement 
Deal, LAW360 (July 28, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1295949/earnin-users-seek-ok-for-12-
5m-settlement-deal [https://perma.cc/W67E-U9G8] (reporting that both California lawsuits are pending 
dismissal subject to court approval of a $12.5-million settlement agreement).  
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IV. REGULATORY SHORTCOMINGS 
This Part begins the inquiry into efficient and effective regulation. 
When treated as money-transmission services, earned-wage programs are 
not effectively regulated to curb the risks described in the foregoing Section. 
This Part demonstrates that the risks attendant to earned-wage programs are 
in more ways explicitly contemplated by the regulatory frameworks for 
lenders, both nonbanks and banks, than those for money transmitters. Yet, 
even the laws applicable to lenders fall short of mitigating some significant 
risks and operate to stifle expansion of the market’s more positive features. 
This Part, thus, reveals that despite their undue risks, earned-wage programs 
uniquely lack meaningful regulatory guardrails. 
A. The Law of Nonbank Money Transmitters 
As applied to earned-wage programs, the law of money transmitters is 
a complete mismatch. The fragmented framework likely creates operational 
challenges for earned-wage providers that offer services nationally.323 Yet, 
the most significant flaw of this framework is that the law of money 
transmitters focuses on risks that are typically not present in earned-wage 
transactions and is not responsive to the many risks that do exist. To be sure, 
federal laws such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Safeguards Rule 
that both protect consumer data are appropriate in the context of earned-wage 
programs,324 which collect personal employment records and even GPS data. 
However, the remaining risks combatted by the law of money transmitters 
are not significant in the context of earned-wage programs. Take, for 
example, money laundering, which requires that an individual (or entity) 
make a series of transfers to different parties.325 In contrast, most earned-
wage programs facilitate transfers between up to three parties that are all 
readily identifiable: the provider, employer, and user. It is nearly impossible 
for users to launder funds through an earned-wage program, making any 
emphasis on money laundering misplaced. 
The risk of loss targeted by state regulation is also remote in the context 
of earned-wage programs. In a traditional money-transmission service, such 
as Western Union, the provider collects funds from a consumer who pays a 
 
 323 Benjamin Lo, Note, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on Payments 
Innovation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 131–41 (2016) (“A nationwide licensing program could cost up 
to one-third of the startup's available funds. Even worse, this figure simply covers application and 
financing costs, and does not include legal fees and any other professional fees needed to meet licensing 
requirements, such as developing an AML program or auditing financial statements.”). 
 324 See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text.  
 325 See supra Section II.A.1. 
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fee for those funds to be transmitted to another party or returned in a different 
form (e.g., prepaid debit cards). In such instances, the state has an interest in 
protecting consumers from losing their funds in the event the provider fails 
to deliver according to the agreement after taking possession of consumer 
funds.326 Indeed, providers could simply take consumer funds without ever 
intending to perform.327 In contrast, earned-wage providers typically perform 
first by transferring their own funds to users for later reimbursement.328 Thus, 
the provider, rather than the user, bears the greater risk of loss in the 
transaction. If the earned-wage program never pays, wages will simply be 
transferred on each user’s regular payday. However, under business models 
where earned-wage providers first receive funds from employers that are 
later transferred to users,329 there is a stronger argument that state money-
transmission law applies. In these transactions, employers entrust funds to 
earned-wage providers in much the same way as consumers do with 
traditional money transmitters.330 Consequently, such earned-wage 
transactions could result in loss to the employer if the earned-wage provider 
is insolvent or intentionally fails to honor its obligation. 
The gravest flaw is that the law of money transmitters fails to address 
the main risks actually posed by earned-wage programs. The risks of loss 
associated with earned-wage programs—i.e., the depletion of future income, 
unduly punitive default risk, and difficult access to low-cost services—are 
not contemplated by the law of money transmitters. Users remain subject to 
high costs, underwriting policies, and repayment terms that make timely 
repayment difficult.331 Accordingly, the law of money transmitters is a 
mismatch for earned-wage programs. 
B. The Law of Nonbank Lenders 
The law of nonbank lenders more appropriately addresses the risks 
posed by earned-wage programs. However, the most effective regulations 
narrowly apply to lenders and loans. If earned-wage programs are in fact 
money transmitters, many of these regulations—e.g., TILA, state usury laws, 
and borrowing restrictions—do not apply.332 Moreover, the state-by-state 
nature of lending regulation creates its own inefficiencies that can be unduly 
 
 326 Tu, supra note 124, at 115. 
 327 Id. 
 328 See supra Section I.A.  
 329  See supra Section I.A. 
 330 See Dresdale, supra note 68. 
 331 See supra Section III.B.1. 
 332 See supra Section III.A. 
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burdensome for most earned-wage providers that offer services in multiple 
states. 
1. The Pros 
The law of nonbank lenders contemplates many of the risks associated 
with earned-wage programs. TILA was specifically created to remedy 
inflated pricing that results from obscure and disparate pricing disclosures 
that characterize the earned-wage market.333 If a law like TILA applied to 
earned-wage programs, FinTech providers would be compelled to compute 
their fees, whether subscription, transaction-based, or recommended tips, 
into APRs or another uniform metric that could be compared across 
substitute services. 
The risks of high costs and repeat use associated with earned-wage 
programs could also be ameliorated under the law of nonbank lenders. Under 
federal law, third-party programs would not be able to charge or recommend 
tips to military members and their dependents that exceed the 36% federal 
usury limit.334 Under state law, fees or tips that result in triple-digit APRs 
would be prohibited in several states where earned-wage programs are 
currently offered.335 With respect to repeat use, some state law mitigates this 
risk via amortization requirements and cooling-off periods.336 Under such 
laws, earned-wage programs could be compelled to give users the option to 
amortize reimbursement over several pay periods at no additional cost.337 
Alternatively, earned-wage programs could be prohibited from authorizing 
back-to-back transfers. Additionally, the law of nonbank lenders 
contemplates some of the risks of undue loss that result under the salary-link 
model.338 State and federal law place limitations on collection practices, 
including the timing and amount of wage assignments.339 Such laws could 
easily apply to restrict the nondefaultable transfers that result from automatic 
and guaranteed reimbursement out of wages. 
 
 333 See supra Section II.B.1 (“[TILA enabled] price comparisons between substitute credit products 
that were otherwise marketed along varying price schemes.”).  
 334 See Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(b). 
 335 E.g., Megan Leonhardt, California Passes New Rules that Cap Personal Loan Interest at 36%, 
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/13/california-passes-new-rules-that-cap-payday-loan-interest-at 
-36percent.html [https://perma.cc/X8RP-YN9E] (Sept. 17, 2019, 4:46 PM) (discussing California state 
law which prohibits lenders from charging more than 36% on consumer loans of $2,500 to $10,000).  
 336 E.g., Payday Loan Laws in Indiana, PANTALASSA LOAN, https://www.pantalassaloan.com/ 
indiana-payday-loan-laws.html [https://perma.cc/DVF7-Y5MG] (describing Indiana lender laws that 
include cooling-off periods and a 15% cap on lender interest rate).  
 337 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 251, at 1.  
 338 See supra Section III.C.2.b. 
 339 See supra Section II.B. 
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2. The Cons 
Although seemingly a good fit, the fragmented nature of the law of 
nonbank lenders presents many drawbacks. First, whether the framework 
effectively regulates the risks posed by earned-wage programs entirely 
depends on where the services are offered, as some states are more restrictive 
than others. Some laws would be so restrictive as to ban earned-wage 
programs,340 while others would be so broad as to subject consumers to all 
risks.341 Neither outcome would be ideal. Second, the state-by-state licensing 
regime and compliance burden would subject most earned-wage providers 
to the laws and oversight of more than fifty jurisdictions. Traditional 
nonbank lenders like payday lenders and pawn shops historically operated 
intrastate, making fragmented regulation more tolerable. However, FinTech 
firms, like earned-wage providers, utilize technology to facilitate borderless 
transacting. Their profitability is often contingent on scaling,342 which a state-
by-state regulatory regime greatly inhibits, if not prohibits altogether. 
In the past, nonbank lenders have attempted to gain access to 
streamlined regulation by partnering with a bank or Native American tribe. 
Under bank-partnership models, the nonbank lender conducts the 
advertising, underwriting, and loan-issuance decisions.343 The bank partner 
issues the loan and subsequently transfers the loan to the nonbank that 
services the loan.344 Under tribal-partnership models, Native American tribes 
have a nominal economic interest in the loan business that is primarily 
operated by a nonbank lender.345 Nonbank lenders are thus indirectly able to 
benefit from federal preemption under bank partnerships and from tribal 
sovereign immunity under tribal partnerships. The result is that nonbanks 
may offer uniform services and escape the burden of state-by-state regulatory 
compliance and licensing. These partnerships also allow nonbanks to offer 
 
 340 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2020) (detailing New York state law 
essentially banning payday lenders due to the 6% interest-rate cap in this statute).  
 341 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-362–367 (2021) (discussing Wyoming state law that 
includes broad definitions and limits, such as a one-month maximum term, that places almost all risk on 
the borrower).  
 342 See Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 129, 131 (2017). 
 343 See Zane Gilmer, “True Lender” Litigation on the Rise: Recent Litigation and Enforcement 
Actions Challenge Traditional Bank Partnership Model, STINSON LLP (Apr. 2, 2018), http://dodd-frank. 
com/2018/04/02/true-lender-litigation-on-the-rise-recent-litigation-and-enforcement-actions-challenge-
traditional-bank-partnership-model/ [https://perma.cc/Q2AS-8SKV]. 
 344 Id. 
 345 See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are 
Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 777 (2012) 
(noting that some tribes receive 1%–2% of payday profits to partner with nontribal payday lenders). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1564 
loans with interest rates and terms that may violate state consumer-protection 
laws.346 
However, the ongoing viability of these partnerships is questionable in 
light of significant state opposition. A growing body of case law finds these 
arrangements to be invalid based on the true lender doctrine.347 The true 
lender doctrine disregards the form of the transaction to find the nonbank 
lender as the true lender given its “predominant economic interest” in the 
loan being issued.348 As the true lender, the lender cannot benefit from federal 
preemption349 or tribal sovereign immunity.350 In the bank-partnership 
context, a minority view holds that the transfer of a loan from a bank to a 
nonbank lender causes the loan to lose its entitlement to federal 
preemption.351 Ultimately, the shaky grounds on which earned-wage 
programs might be able to enjoy federal preemption are likely insufficient to 
overcome the operational hurdle of state-by-state compliance for the market 
should nonbank-lender law apply. 
Several more drawbacks exist under the law of nonbank lenders. The 
law does not compel nonbank lenders to disclose customer information to 
credit bureaus; rather, the law only requires that disclosure be accurate and 
complete if volunteered by the lender.352 Additionally, in the context of small 
loans, the law takes a roundabout approach to regulating repeat use (e.g., 
amortization requirements and cooling-off periods) rather than tackling the 
root cause: the absence of an ability-to-repay analysis. The CFPB attempted 
to remedy this gap in the law with a federal ability-to-pay rule for most small-
sum lenders but reversed its position in 2018 to the dismay of consumer 
interest groups.353 This rule, however, was drafted to explicitly exempt 
employer-sponsored programs that facilitate nonrecourse transfers and any 
programs with tip-based compensation models on the assumption that such 
 
 346 See id. at 764–67 (noting that some lenders claim tribal sovereign immunity to evade state usury 
laws and payday bans). 
 347 See John Hannon, The True Lender Doctrine: Function over Form as a Reasonable Constraint 
on the Exportation of Interest Rates, 67 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1280–83 (2018). 
 348 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 
4820635, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016), appeal denied, No. 17-80006 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017). 
 349 See id. at *9. 
 350 See People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 375–79 (Cal. 2016) (holding that 
tribal sovereign immunity did not apply where tribes did not maintain operational control of payday 
business). 
 351 See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 352 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
 353 See Kate Berry, CFPB to Scrap Key Underwriting Portion of Payday Rule, AM. BANKER (Jan. 
14, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-to-scrap-key-underwriting-portion-
of-payday-rule [https://perma.cc/CS82-S4AK]. 
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programs do not pose similar risks.354 Thus, even were the CFPB to 
implement the rule as contemplated, many earned-wage programs would not 
be subject to it. 
Finally, the law of nonbank lenders in material respects applies 
exclusively to lenders and loans. For example, TILA explicitly applies to 
entities that provide “consumer credit” extended over “more than four 
installments” or in exchange for a “finance charge.”355 Usury laws that 
restrict fees narrowly apply to “loan[s] or [the] forbearance of any money, 
goods, or things in action.”356 Laws that restrict repeat use apply specifically 
to small-sum loans.357 The same is the case with laws applicable to 
amortization and prepayment terms.358 Thus, to the extent that earned-wage 
programs are money-transmission services, these rules would not apply. 
C. The Law of FinTech: The FinTech Charter 
The primary benefit of a FinTech charter from the OCC is that it 
promises more streamlined regulation for efficient operations and 
nationwide scaling. However, the charter has numerous shortcomings, 
including its questionable long-term viability, onerous compliance 
requirements, as well as its failure to clarify applicable laws for earned wage 
access programs, offer adequate consumer protections, and regulate 
substitute services. 
Specifically, the OCC’s FinTech charter faces substantial legal 
opposition which calls into question its future. A recent federal district court 
decision found that, in the absence of congressional action authorizing the 
FinTech charter, the OCC may issue national bank charters only to 
depositary institutions.359 Although the decision is stayed pending appeal,360 
 
 354 See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,413 
(July 22, 2020). 
 355 Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2018).  
 356 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2020); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2 (West 2020) 
(using similar language). 
 357 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(18)–(19) (West 2019) (prohibiting rollovers and requiring 
twenty-four-hour cooling period between consecutive loan issuances); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/2-
5, 2-30 (West 2019) (prohibiting rollovers and requiring seven-day cooling period between forty-five-
day lending period). 
 358 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-401(4) (West 2018) (requiring that after three consecutive 
loans, the lender must offer a four-installment repayment plan at no additional cost).  
 359 Vullo v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that 
the “business of banking” used in the National Bank Act “unambiguously requires receiving deposits as 
an aspect of the business”). 
 360 See Brief for Appellee, Lacewell v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271 (2d Cir. July 
23, 2020). In connection with this appeal, the author of this Article joined thirty-two other legal scholars 
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the legal uncertainty likely contributes to why no firm has applied for a 
FinTech charter.361 Additionally, the FinTech charter contemplates 
significant compliance requirements that are not only discouragingly 
onerous362 but also aimed at risks that are extremely remote for the earned-
wage market. Systemic risk concerns would be misplaced for such a small, 
relatively inconsequential segment of the financial market, and, as 
previously noted, money-laundering concerns would be misplaced given the 
nature of earned-wage transactions.363 
Importantly, the FinTech charter provides no greater clarity as to which 
laws—lending or money transmissions—govern earned wage access 
programs. It simply assigns the OCC as regulator without specifying the 
framework within which the OCC will regulate.364 The OCC historically has 
not imposed or enforced comprehensive, service-term regulations of the kind 
required to adequately protect against the risks identified herein. Indeed, the 
CFPB was established in part to take such regulatory oversight away from 
the OCC and other federal regulators that focus on solvency and systemic 
risks.365 There is no reason to believe the OCC would be equipped or inclined 
to take on such responsibility with respect to the earned-wage market. 
Finally, the OCC does not supervise substitute service providers like 
traditional payday lenders and state-chartered institutions offering small-
dollar liquidity solutions. Inconsistent regulation and supervision of 
 
in an amicus brief supporting the position that the OCC lacks authority to issue FinTech charters. See 
Brief of Thirty-Three Banking Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, Lacewell v. Off. 
of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271 (2d Cir. July 29, 2020). 
 361 Rachel Witkowski, Google and PayPal Explored OCC’s Fintech Charter, then Walked Away, 
AM. BANKER (June 16, 2019, 9:50 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/google-and-paypal-
explored-occs-fintech-charter-then-walked-away [https://perma.cc/M697-NH8N] (“Google and PayPal, 
as well as several others, have since backed off over fears that they could harm existing relationships with 
state regulators and concerns about whether the OCC will prevail in a legal challenge to its authority to 
create the fintech charter.”). 
 362 Id. (“‘[P]eople that have come in and talked to [the OCC] realize [it] expect[s] real capital, real 
liquidity, solid risk management programs and profitability . . . . That’s not an easy bar to get over.’” 
(quoting former Comptroller of the Currency Joseph Otting)). 
 363 See supra Section IV.A; see also History of Anti-money Laundering Laws, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T 
NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws [https://perma.cc/S5SU-7MS7]. 
 364 See generally OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING 
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES (2018). 
 365 See The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/ 
the-bureau/#:~:text=The%20CFPB%20was%20created%20to,was%20divided%20among%20several% 
20agencies [https://perma.cc/LKN8-DZA2]. This approach borrows from the “twin peaks” model of 
regulation common in other countries. Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1140 (2015) (describing the twin-peaks model used 
in some countries). 
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substitute services could have the negative effect of influencing consumer 
decisions based on the “degree of regulation rather than on their relative 
economic benefits.”366 
 
*          *          * 
 
In the absence of regulatory clarity and effective risk management, 
many earned-wage users may be exposed to risks from which their 
policymakers and regulators otherwise endeavor to protect them. Indeed, 
military members may unwittingly find themselves dependent on a service 
their military superiors would otherwise believe contributes to their reduced 
morale and readiness, as in the payday-loan context. Still, other users may 
be at risk for the very type of cyclical use, high fees, and overdraft charges 
that their home states similarly seek to limit. And, probably most alarming, 
customers who consciously avoid the ills of payday lending may fall victim 
to earned-wage programs by viewing them as harmless money 
transmissions. Yet, even if users successfully navigate the earned-wage 
market, they may find it difficult to access cheaper traditional credit 
products. In such instances, remaining perpetually entangled in the market’s 
services means it could only be a matter of time until such users fall victim 
to the market’s risks. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding Parts III and IV demonstrate that earned-wage programs 
pose significant risks to consumers that the existing legal framework for 
money transmittersthe classification preferred by earned-wage 
providerswholly fails to mitigate. However, Part IV also proves there are 
shortcomings even for the more restrictive legal framework for lenders, 
including its failure to curb certain risks unique to earned-wage markets and 
its inability to provide uniform regulation for borderless transacting. This 
Part explores solutions that can facilitate the earned-wage market’s growth 
 
 366 Robert L. Clarke & Todd J. Zywicki, Payday Lending, Bank Overdraft Protection, and Fair 
Competition at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235, 237 (2013); 
see also DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING 
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 69 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY8G-26C3] (“Fairness, effective competition, and efficient 
markets require consistent regulatory treatment for similar products.”). 
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via uniformity without sacrificing consumer protection.367 It then considers 
the implications of these proposals and addresses potential concerns. 
A. Policy Recommendations 
Banning a small-sum liquidity solution does not eliminate consumer 
demand; rather, it directs consumers to substitutes that could be better or 
worse.368 For this reason, it would not be ideal to ban earned-wage programs 
altogether because, in some ways, they are improvements on payday loans 
and similar substitute products. The earned-wage market adds lower price 
points to the broader small-sum liquidity market, particularly when earned-
wage programs are subsidized by employers.369 Earned-wage programs help 
limit overexposure to debt since the programs more precisely assess expected 
income flows.370 The ability to access funds via mobile and internet 
applications can save time, costs, and inconvenience associated with travel 
to brick-and-mortar storefronts that offer payday loans and similar solutions. 
Moreover, increased competition in the market by FinTech providers could 
even improve the quality and costs of the products and services offered by 
traditional payday lenders and other substitute providers.371 
Accordingly, the most effective policy will allow the market to grow 
but in a way that minimizes consumer risks. As was the case for the earliest 
 
 367 As this market is rapidly developing, so too is the legal landscape. Policymakers at both the state 
and federal level are currently exploring incremental steps to enable, monitor, and lightly regulate the 
nascent market with narrow safe harbors, sandboxes, memoranda of understanding, and distinct licensing 
regimes for earned-wage programs. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text; see also The DFPI 
Signs MOUs Believed to Be Among the Nation’s First with Earned Wage Access Companies, CAL. DEP’T 
FIN. PROT. & INNNOVATION (Jan. 27, 2021), https://dfpi.ca.gov/2021/01/27/the-dfpi-signs-mous-
believed-to-be-the-among-the-nations-first-with-earned-wage-access-companies/ [https://perma.cc/JFF3 
-YZBL]. The recommendations in this Part should be considered in connection with any long-term policy 
plan. 
 368 See Bhutta et al., supra note 227, at 225 (finding that consumer demand shifts to substitute 
services like pawnshop services, bank overdrafts, or bounced checks when payday loans are banned, 
thereby arguing that regulation of payday loans in isolation may be ineffective or counterproductive). 
 369 See supra Section III.B.1.a. 
 370 See supra Section III.B.1.b. 
 371 See, e.g., Inbal Lavi, The Rise of Robo-Advisors: How Banking and Wealth Management Is 
Changing with Technology, MARTECH SERIES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://martechseries.com/mts-
insights/guest-authors/the-rise-of-robo-advisors-how-banking-and-wealth-management-is-changing-
with-technology/ [https://perma.cc/FQ3J-NNJK] (discussing FinTech’s pressure on traditional loan 
services to provide lower costs for higher functionality); Zelle: The Banking Industry’s Response to 
Fintech Disruptors, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 5, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/0
9/05/zelle-the-banking-industrys-response-to-fintech-di.aspx [https://perma.cc/ANL9-HC8A] 
(describing peer-to-peer payment service Zelle as “the banks’ answer to Venmo,” a mobile peer-to-peer 
payment system, thereby highlighting FinTech driving traditional bank innovation to meet consumer 
demand). 
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banks established in the United States, the interstate nature of most earned 
wage service models urges uniform regulation and oversight.372 However, 
uniformity should not sacrifice the ability to curb identified risks to 
consumer financial welfare through service-term regulations, including 
uniform price disclosures, ability-to-repay rules, optional amortization 
mechanics, mandatory credit reporting, and the right-to-rescind assignment. 
1. Small-Sum Liquidity Law 
The most effective regulation would apply consistently to earned-wage 
programs and similar small-sum liquidity solutions like payday loans. 
Application of the legal framework should be determined based on the 
substantive similarities in transactions between consumers and providers 
rather than technology, terminology, or context. Accordingly, the proposal 
described herein, the Small-Sum Liquidity Law (the Small-Sum Law), 
should broadly apply to institutions that offer liquidity to consumers in 
exchange for a fee with reimbursement paid at a later time. The Small-Sum 
Law should include five basic consumer-protection provisions intended to 
curb the risks identified in this Article: uniform price disclosures, ability-to-
repay rules, optional installment-repayment mechanics, mandatory credit-
score reporting, and right-to-rescind mechanics.  
First, the law should compel all providers to make uniform price 
disclosures. This particular proposal is likely the path of least resistance since 
mandatory disclosures are oft-used policy tools for mitigating against 
information asymmetries and incentivizing better consumer decision-
making.373 Notwithstanding, the academic literature is extremely skeptical of 
the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure, especially under TILA.374 The 
critiques, however, are rarely that mandatory disclosure inherently has zero 
efficacy;375 rather, the effectiveness is likely to be severely diminished when 
disclosures are too numerous, complex, lack material data points, or are 
 
 372 Cf. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310–18 
(1978) (reflecting the Court’s reluctance to limit national banks’ flexibility to export interest rates among 
the states without specific congressional intent given the complexities of the national modern banking 
system supported by the National Banking Act). 
 373 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 653–54, 659 (2011) (discussing the pervasiveness of disclosure rules for credit services, 
including payday loans and mortgage lending, and for overdraft fees, noting that “[a]ttempts to protect 
low-income borrowers often prompt disclosure requirements”).  
 374 See, e.g., id. at 679–727. 
 375 See Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success 
or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 354 (2013) (noting that studies with negative findings for disclosure 
effectiveness could nonetheless be read as demonstrating that disclosure is positively impacting 
information access and outcomes for 10%–30% of consumers). 
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proffered when consumers are unable to respond to such information.376 The 
Small-Sum Law’s disclosure requirement is likely to avoid several of these 
shortcomings because it will be simple and comprehensive. The law should 
require earned-wage providers to prominently disclose uniform price 
conversions, akin to an APR,377 for all fees, whether flat, subscription, or tip 
based.378 This should be a relatively straightforward calculation since earned-
wage programs involve simple fee and transaction structures. Admittedly, 
however, the disclosure requirement is not intended to shift consumer 
behavior for would-be payday borrowers. Instead, this requirement is 
intended to help consumers who are price- or information-sensitive, such as 
the debt collector who avoided payday loans but inadvertently found himself 
exposed to earned-wage risks.379  
Second, the law should establish an “ability to repay” (ATR) rule 
applicable to all providers. Repeat use and its negative consequences are 
likely to result regardless of whether an earned-wage program is third-party 
or employer sponsored since both models have high pricing and balloon-
repayment terms that fail to consider users’ other expenses. Consequently, 
there is no need for a carve-out for the latter model. The ATR rule should 
involve a two-part inquiry. First, the law should create an ATR presumption 
wherein a specified percentage of take-home pay per pay period, or an “ATR 
cap,” is deemed affordable without further inquiry. The ATR cap should 
 
 376 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 373, at 666 (discussing TILA); see also Lauren E. 
Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. 
L. REV. 707, 767–68 (2006).  
 377 To be clear, the pricing metric need not be an APR. It need only be a uniform metric that reflects 
typical usage patterns. More data on usage trends are, therefore, key to better understand the degree of 
financial risk and to establish the most appropriate disclosure metric. A recent report published 
simultaneously with this Article suggests that on average, earned-wage users make transfers 
consecutively for at least six semimonthly periods, or in every pay period for three months. Thus, a pricing 
metric based on quarterly percentage rates may be appropriate for the market. See DEVINA KHANNA & 
ARJUN KAUSHAL, FIN. HEALTH NETWORK, EARNED WAGE ACCESS & DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVANCE 
USAGE TRENDS 8–9 (2021). 
 378 It is not enough that providers must comply with TILA, because certain small-sum liquidity 
services (e.g., bank-overdraft protection) are currently carved out of TILA requirements. See CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, COMMENTS TO THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, IMPACTS OF 
OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS ON CONSUMERS 19 (2012), https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/Comments. 
CFPB.Overdraft.CRL.CFA%20.NCLC6.29.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q86Y-YCJB]. The SSLL will 
enhance price competition amongst all similar providers. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 
69 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LJJ-
5T3T] (“[S]imilar disclosure treatment for similar products enables consumers to make informed choices 
based on a full appreciation of the nature and risks of the product and enables providers to compete fairly 
and vigorously.”). 
 379 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
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draw from empirical work, such as recent studies that demonstrate payday 
borrowers can afford to apply only 5% of take-home pay toward payday-
loan servicing.380 Second, should a provider’s repayment schedule exceed the 
ATR cap, the law should compel the provider to conduct a more narrowly 
tailored assessment of the user’s ability to repay. This two-part ATR rule 
would reasonably ensure that users do not fall into costly cycles of use that 
are difficult to escape. The simple ATR rule would also avoid imposing 
prohibitive underwriting costs on providers. 
Third, the law should establish that providers must offer installment 
repayment options to consumers. While more flexible terms might result 
from the ATR rule, the law should be explicit to mandate installments where 
necessary to ensure affordability. State laws bar balloon repayment in several 
contexts to protect consumers from undue financial strain. Installment 
requirements exist in the payday-lending context in some states,381 even 
when employers directly issue payroll advances or accidentally overpay 
employees.382 The installment requirement should align with the ATR rule 
such that installment payments in any pay period do not exceed the ATR cap.  
Fourth, providers should be compelled to report consumer repayment 
history. Admittedly, this significant intervention would set providers of 
small-sum liquidity solutions apart from mainstream lenders who are not 
compelled by existing regulation to report to credit bureaus. Nonetheless, 
mainstream lenders feel pressure to report credit information to continue 
accessing credit-bureau systems.383 Mandatory credit reporting under the 
Small-Sum Law is a necessary intervention since providers do not rely on 
credit-bureau reporting systems. Mandatory credit reporting could be an 
escape valve for consumers who are trapped by poor or limited credit 
histories—a true bridge to increased access to credit. It would also force 
providers of small-sum liquidity solutions to improve services to maintain 
consumer relationships. Although negative credit history would be included, 
such history is in many instances already reported when defaulted 
 
 380 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 251, at 2. 
 381 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-366(a) (2021) (“[A] consumer who is unable to repay a post-
dated check or similar arrangement when due may elect once every twelve (12) months to repay the post-
dated check or similar arrangement by means of an extended payment plan.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
15-17(3)(H) (2020) (“A lender shall not make a loan [for less than $5,000] unless the loan is an installment 
loan . . . .”). 
 382 See, e.g., Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 177 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805–06 (1981) (holding that a 
balloon payment on separation of employment to repay employee’s debt to employer is an unlawful 
deduction); Cal. State Emps.’ Ass’n v. State, 243 Cal. Rptr. 602, 605 (1988) (holding that it is unlawful 
to deduct from current payroll for past salary advances that were in error). 
 383 Brooks, supra note 271, at 1019–20. 
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obligations, even within the payday-loan context, are transferred to 
collection agencies.384 This proposal would improve the accuracy of credit 
scoring. Additionally, it is an opportunity for providers to share with users 
the benefit of the low default rates associated with these products. 
Finally, employers and earned-wage providers must give users the right 
to rescind or delay payroll deductions for earned-wage transfers, and such 
right must be effectively disclosed. This would eliminate the collateralization 
of employment, freeing users from feeling bound to a position as a result of 
perpetual liquidity shortfalls. It would also give users the right of efficient 
breach that is inherent in most consumer transactions. In a movement toward 
Pareto optimality, the requirement would encourage efficient allocation of 
user resources with respect to their employment and debt management.385 
2. Supervision and Enforcement 
a. Federal level 
The Small-Sum Law would ideally be enacted and enforced by a federal 
regulator to ensure that there is uniform and efficient regulation of largely 
nationwide services. Specifically, the CFPB is experienced in developing 
and ensuring compliance with consumer-protection laws—it was created for 
that very purpose. It has institutional knowledge based on internal research 
regarding the risks associated with consumer lending generally and small-
sum lending in particular.386 The CFPB has taken enforcement actions 
against payday lenders387 and proposed rules to regulate the small-sum loan 
market.388 Moreover, it has full examination and supervisory authority over 
a host of financial service providers, including payday lenders.389 
 
 384 See Kelly Anne Smith, How to Respond When Your Debt Is Sent to Collections, FORBES (Feb. 
26, 2020, 9:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-loans/accounts-in-debt-collection/#how-
does-it-affect-your-credit-score [https://perma.cc/X2Y6-K74E] (“An account in collections is one of the 
biggest blows to your credit score.”). 
 385 See Birmingham, supra note 311, at 284 (explaining how certain types of breach of contract 
should be encouraged as it “is a movement toward Pareto optimality”). 
 386 See, e.g., Data and Research, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/ [https://perma.cc/88N5-7URS] (listing CFPB’s 
research databases). 
 387 See, e.g., Think Finance, LLC, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/think-finance-llc-formerly-
known-think-finance-inc/ [https://perma.cc/2Y95-7A9U] (discussing a case the CFPB brought against 
payday lender Think Finance, LLC). 
 388 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Rule to End Payday Debt Traps, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 2, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-proposes-rule-end-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/VBZ9-NHUD]. 
 389 Institutions Subject to CFPB Supervisory Authority, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervision-examinations/institutions/  
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Accordingly, the CFPB is best positioned to be the federal regulator of a 
small-sum liquidity sector that includes earned-wage programs. 
An important threshold question is whether earned-wage providers fall 
under the CFPB’s supervisory authority. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
CFPB has authority to examine and supervise depositary institutions and 
credit unions with assets exceeding $10 billion,390 mortgage lenders,391 
student-loan lenders,392 payday lenders,393 designated “larger participant[s]” 
of a particular consumer-finance market segment,394 and certain high-risk 
market participants.395 Of these categories, there are two on which the CFPB 
could rely to supervise earned-wage providers. First, earned-wage providers 
could constitute payday lenders if the services are deemed to be extensions 
or advances of credit. Such a determination may lead to judicial intervention 
and statutory interpretation similar to that required in the early years of 
payday lending.396 Alternatively, and as a potentially more efficient 
approach, the CFPB could consult with the Federal Trade Commission to 
issue a rule designating certain earned-wage providers as “larger 
participants” in the earned-wage market.397 While this rule would not capture 
all earned-wage providers, it would likely capture the major participants 
identified in this Article and avoid the uncertainty and lengthy timeline of a 
final judicial determination of whether earned-wage transfers constitute 
credit. 
b. State level 
Although the Small-Sum Law should be implemented and enforced at 
the federal level, practicality may require individual states to act first. State 
 
[https://perma.cc/2FT6-4DCA]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(A) (stating general categories of entities 
that fall under the CFPB’s supervision). 
 390 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a). 
 391 Id. § 5514(a)(1)(A). 
 392 Id. § 5514(a)(1)(D). 
 393 Id. § 5514(a)(1)(E). 
 394 Id. § 5514(a)(1)(B). 
 395 Id. § 5514(a)(1)(C) (authorizing supervision of a market participant upon reasonable 
determination of risks that participant poses to consumers based on a collection of consumer complaints 
and notice to market participant with opportunity for that participant to respond). 
 396 See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 & n.4 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (“It is hard to imagine 
how charges for exchanging money today for more money at a later date could be classified as anything 
but interest on a loan when the transactions do not include a sale of property.”); In re Miller, 215 B.R. 
970, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997) (“[Defendants] are disbursing funds to people like the plaintiff on the 
promise of repayment of the sum plus the ‘service charge’ . . . . If this is not an extension of credit, this 
Court finds it hard to imagine any transaction that is.”); Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. 
Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (2000) (“A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [Defendant] made loans to 
[Plaintiff] . . . . By agreeing not to cash [plaintiff’s] check until his payday, [Defendant] forbore its right 
to negotiate the checks.”). 
 397 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B). 
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regulators could act to implement state-level small-sum liquidity laws like 
the one described above. However, the states should not cripple the earned-
wage market or other FinTech entrants with bifurcated and innumerable 
regulatory requirements. Accordingly, it would be highly preferable for the 
states to adopt a uniform model law. 
B. Potential Concerns and Responses 
The Small-Sum Law aims to benefit consumers by facilitating the 
expansion of the earned-wage market’s better side and curbing its downside 
risks with increased competition among substitute services as well as 
improved transparency, affordability, and bargaining power for consumers. 
Yet, the proposal is not without potential concerns. This Section addresses 
three such concerns and demonstrates why the Small-Sum Law is 
nonetheless the best option for regulating the earned-wage market. 
1. Federalism 
The existing small-sum liquidity market, including payday lending and 
earned-wage programs, is within the primary jurisdiction of state (rather than 
federal) lawmakers. Proponents of the bifurcated nature of financial 
regulation might champion state-level regulation over federal-level 
regulation as less at risk for regulatory capture and more effective in driving 
robust consumer protections. However, the fragmented regulatory 
framework for payday loans is a cautionary tale about the ineffectiveness of 
state-based regulation in the small-sum loan market.398 State regulation 
allows for gaping and inconsistent holes in base-level protections on a state-
by-state basis. Providers are able to circumvent regulations by offering 
services close to the borders between permissive states and restrictive 
states399 and to exploit federal regulatory loopholes more explicitly by 
offering services where otherwise prohibited.400 Earned-wage programs are 
 
 398 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 122 (“State-by-state efforts at regulation are inadequate and 
inefficient because, as explained below, the rent-a-bank practice circumvents state laws designed to 
protect consumers, and many states do not afford consumers a base level of necessary protections.”). 
 399 See, e.g., Anne Fleming, Federal Regulation of Payday Loans Is Actually a Win for States’ Rights, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/ 
wp/2017/10/09/federal-regulation-of-payday-loans-is-actually-a-win-for-states-rights/ [https://perma.cc/ 
B77R-66KR] (“Lenders in permissive states may continue to lend to borrowers in restrictive states in 
violation of state law.”). 
 400 See, e.g., SUSANNA MONTEZEMOLO, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDING 
ABUSES AND PREDATORY PRACTICES 8 (2013), https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-
lending/reports/10-Payday-Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/338B-M9HZ] (“[B]anks offering open-ended 
payday loans are able to circumvent the MLA.”); Shen Lu, How Payday Lenders Get Around Interest 
Rate Regulations, MAGNIFY MONEY (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/news/how-
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likely to be even more effective at evading or inadvertently violating 
regulation through borderless internet and mobile platforms than payday 
lenders that operate primarily out of brick-and-mortar locations. Moreover, 
as seen with payday regulation, state regulation in the broader small-sum 
credit market does not foster a “race to the top” in reigning in market risks. 
There is no reason to think regulation of the earned-wage market is going to 
illicit a different state response. While state-based regulation has a long 
history of failure in this sector, it is too early to tell whether federal-level 
reforms would be counterproductive. To the contrary, uniform federal-level 
consumer protections have historically been the solution when state law falls 
short.401 
2. Regulatory Experimentation 
Proponents of state-level regulation might also be concerned that the 
Small-Sum Law might quell necessary regulatory experimentation that is 
otherwise likely to occur with varied state regimes in a nascent market. 
Indeed, state-level policymakers are already considering different 
approaches to regulating earned-wage programs. Some states are considering 
distinct licensing frameworks for certain earned-wage programs. Other states 
have entered into memoranda of understanding that allow market 
participants to operate freely, subject to heightened reporting requirements. 
Still others might consider subjecting earned-wage programs to restrictive 
lending laws or take a “wait and see” approach to earned-wage concerns.  
However, while fostering regulatory innovation, such disparate state-
level regimes might actually stifle market innovation and improvements in 
the FinTech era.402 The operational hurdles of state-by-state licensing 
schemes and regulatory oversight disadvantage new market entrants with 
high start-up costs that can be prohibitive for their profit model.403 Also, such 
bifurcated regulation may in effect disenfranchise citizens in certain states if 
market regulation is driven primarily by a minority of large, powerful 
states.404 Uniformity in regulation does not have to sacrifice experimentation. 
Federal-level frameworks can facilitate experimentation, including, for 
example, through regulatory sandboxes. When borderless transacting is an 
 
payday-lenders-get-around-interest-rate-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/V3R2-U7FT] (discussing that 
payday lenders evade regulation by operating as loan brokers instead of direct lenders, or by offering 
installment loans or lines of credit instead of single-payment loans). 
 401 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, 7 C.F.R. § 1901.203; Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77m). 
 402 See Knight, supra note 342, at 185–86. 
 403 Id. at 186. 
 404 Id. at 195. 
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essential element to improved costs and service offerings in a marketplace, 
borderless regulatory regimes should be created to facilitate its growth.  
Moreover, not all experimentation is ideal. As states consider ways to 
regulate earned-wage programs, they should be cautious not to adopt certain 
features of early, unsuccessful efforts to reign in the earned-wage market.405 
First, state policymakers should not reflexively adopt common policy 
prescriptions like fee caps and transfer limits to curtail financial distress. 
These prescriptions fail to appreciate that several features of earned-wage 
programs work in concert (rather than independently) to make repayment 
difficult and lead to habitual use. Second, policymakers should not narrowly 
focus on limiting late fees; doing so risks ignoring the likelihood that users 
will simply make additional transfers after a timely repayment, which has 
the same effect of imposing a fee for a term extension. Third, policymakers 
should not be satisfied that earned-wage programs’ loan-like repayment risks 
are sufficiently curbed if services are nonrecourse or payments are not 
reported to credit bureaus. Such an approach ignores the practical 
enforcement mechanisms that can be more threatening than a potential 
lawsuit. For employer-sponsored programs, it would be the need to find other 
employment to avoid payment. For third-party programs, it would be the 
need to endure bank nonsufficient-fund fees to avoid payment. Moreover, 
eliminating the risk of a potential lawsuit over nonpayment is not worth the 
trade-off of making the service credit invisible, especially since the service 
is currently designed to be nearly default-proof in many contexts. Finally, 
policymakers should refrain from barring payday lenders and earned-wage 
providers from obtaining licenses under the same state licensing 
frameworks. Such fragmented regulation fails to incent competition 
necessary for broader market improvements and is likely to result in a 
selection of market winners and losers based on policy effects rather than 
optimal consumer services. 
3. Market Contraction 
Lastly, regulation is not without costs. The Small-Sum Law is likely to 
impose compliance costs on earned-wage providers that must be weighed 
against any potential returns for providing services. Consequently, there may 
be some concern that the proposal will have the unintended effects of 
eradicating the earned-wage market despite demand, thereby forcing 
 
 405 This critique is derived from a review of the first state proposal for a distinct earned-wage 
licensing framework, which was proposed by the state legislature in California but failed to be passed 
into law. See generally S. 472, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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consumers to seek out inferior and nefarious substitutes.406 However, the 
proposal focuses on solutions that are low cost (e.g., price disclosure), 
already exist in the market to some degree (e.g., installment requirements 
and rescission rights), or are arguably necessary for consumer welfare while 
giving providers flexibility to set terms (e.g., ATR requirements). In other 
words, the Small-Sum Law is a moderate proposal that likely facilitates safer 
innovations within the market while curbing downside risks.  
Further, to limit the risk of inferior substitutes, the Small-Sum Law is 
designed to broadly apply to a particular class of financial products based on 
their risk profile rather than their form so that earned-wage programs, payday 
loans, and innovations yet conceived are regulated under the same 
framework. Thus, at best, the consequence might be to force innovation for 
improved consumer services because arbitrage is not easily achievable; at 
worst, the consequence might be a broader market contraction so significant 
that the majority of consumers in this market are unable to lawfully meet 
their basic needs. In this worst-case scenario, the market response raises a 
set of fundamental questions. First, should the law facilitate a market that is 
inherently incapable of offering affordable liquidity solutions to the most 
financially vulnerable consumers?407 Second, is government involvement 
required to develop sustainable options given the limits and failures of the 
private market? Reality probably lies somewhere between the best- and 
worst-case scenarios. Consequently, with the implementation of the Small-
Sum Law, policymakers should be clear-eyed about optimizing private-
market solutions to address select small-sum liquidity concerns and to 
facilitate efficient allocation of limited public resources for those consumers 
the private markets cannot serve. 
 
*          *          * 
 
In sum, there are no regulatory frameworks that effectively mitigate the 
risks of earned-wage programs while simultaneously fostering the 
development of a robust small-sum liquidity market in the FinTech era. The 
ideal framework consists of streamlined oversight and consumer protections 
related to both process and service terms, including price-disclosure rules, 
ability-to-repay requirements, optional amortization mechanics, mandatory 
credit scoring, and the right to rescind assignments. While such a framework 
 
 406 Cf. Atkinson, supra note 196, at 1109 (summarizing the debate over the Payday Rule, noting that 
opposition to payday-loan regulation includes a concern that such regulation would cause payday loans 
to “dry up” and force low-income borrowers “to seek credit . . . from unseemly credit providers”). 
 407 See id. (examining whether credit is even an appropriate mechanism as a substitute for social 
provisions to low-income consumers). 
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would most efficiently work at the federal level under the statutory authority 
of the CFPB, it could also be implemented via a state-level uniform model 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article develops a nascent conversation to encourage ongoing 
scholarship on earned-wage programs. Important questions—including 
whether these programs cause users to fall into cyclical debt traps or become 
more financially distressed—are outside its scope but should be studied 
empirically. Notwithstanding, this Article undertakes a deep-dive 
assessment of the earned-wage market to make five contributions to legal 
scholarship. First, it provides a taxonomy of the business models and fee 
structures in the earned-wage market. Second, it explains that money-
transmission and loan services are differentiated by the latter’s deferred 
repayment-feature mechanics, which introduce behavioral gaffes associated 
with intertemporal decision-making and heighten nonpayment risks. Third, 
it demonstrates that earned-wage programs and payday loans share features 
that have been associated with financial harm to consumers in the latter 
context. Fourth, it identifies certain features—the multiple fee structures and 
the salary link—as raising financial-harm concerns that are unique to the 
earned-wage market. Finally, it analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of 
money-transmission law—under which earned-wage programs currently 
operate—nonbank-lender law, and the FinTech charter to curtail the risks 
presented by this multibillion-dollar market. In doing so, this Article 
demonstrates how earned-wage programs pose risks that are not only 
substantially similar to those posed by payday loans but also potentially 
heightened in the context of earned-wage programs due to unique market and 
product features and the regulatory laxity these programs currently enjoy. 
Thus, regulatory intervention is necessary but should be tailored to 
simultaneously protect consumers and incentivize the development of a 
robust small-sum liquidity market in the FinTech era. The flaws in the 
current system are largely rooted in the fact that federal law lacks effective 
consumer-protection policies, and the patchwork of state regulations inhibits 
the nationwide business models of nonbank, FinTech firms. Therefore, this 
Article proposes that a comprehensive small-sum  liquidity lawSmall-Sum 
Liquidity Law be enacted at the federal level and enforced by the CFPB. In 
doing so, it appreciates that inconsistent regulation typically results in 
anticompetitive markets and is likely to push unsuspecting consumers 
towards potentially more harmful products. While this Article does not detail 
every aspect of the proposed law, it identifies five features that are critical to 
the success of any such framework: uniform price disclosure, ability-to-
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repay rules, optional amortization mechanics, mandatory credit reporting, 
and the right to rescind assignments. A competitive and robust small-sum 
liquidity market should emerge to bring solutions to low- and moderate-
income consumers that are wealth enhancing. If earned-wage programs are 
to replace the dominant payday lenders in the fringe financial sector, it is 
imperative that they function as the expansion of access to low-cost and 
mainstream services rather than the rise of fringe FinTech, or FringeTech, 
services. 
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